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St. Claire: The Spreading of Interest under the Actuarial Method.

THE "SPREADING OF INTEREST" UNDER THE
ACTUARIAL METHOD
FRANK A. ST. CLAIRE'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The definition of usury has changed throughout the course of
history.' Originally, in the Middle Ages, any compensation for the
use of money was usury.' The term usury in today's parlance means
the loaning of money at an interest rate in excess of that permitted
3
by law.
For a short time Texas abolished all legislation concerning usury.'
Since 1876, however, the regulation of usury has been mandated by
the Texas Constitution.5 The current provision of the constitution
provides in part:
The Legislature shall have authority to classify loans and lenders,
license and regulate lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates
of interest; provided, however, in the absence of legislation fixing
maximum rates of interest all contracts for a greater rate of interest
than ten per centum (10%) per annum shall be deemed usurious;
provided, further, that in contracts where no rate of interest is agreed
upon, the rate shall not exceed six per centum (6%) per annum.
© Copyright 1979 by Frank A. St. Claire. All rights reserved.
*

B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., New York University; member of

the firm of Wallenstein & St. Claire, Dallas, Texas. The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance of Gwen M. Eisenstein, an associate of the firm, and Kathleen K. Tucker, attorney
at law, Tyler, Texas.
1. See generally S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES (1963); J. MURRAY, THE HISTORY
OF USURY (1866); J. NOONAN, THE SCHOLAsTIc ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957). See also TEx. CONST.
art. XVI, § 11, comment (Vernon 1955).
2. A return on an investment in an enterprise was permitted but only if the lender agreed
to share in the business losses of the enterprise in addition to bearing the risk of the borrower's
failure to repay the loan. Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to CurrentConvenience-A Study
of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 233 (1968). For a discussion of equity participation
loans, see Comment, The Application of Texas Usury Laws to Equity Participation
Agreements, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 925 (1970).
3. See Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(d) (Vernon 1971).
4. "All usury laws are abolished in this State, and the Legislature is forbidden from
making laws limiting the parties to contracts in the amount of interest they may agree upon
" Tx. CONST. art. XII, § 44 (1869).
for loans of money or other property .....
5. Because of ensuing credit abuses, regulation of usury was included in the Texas
Constitution of 1876 in article XVI, § 11. Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 11, comment (Vernon 1955).
6. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11. The authority of the Texas Legislature to classify loans
and lenders, to define interest and to fix maximum rates of interest was granted by amend-
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Unfortunately, neither the constitution nor the statutes provide
guidance concerning what charges constitute interest. Prior to the
enactment of Texas Revised Civil Statute article 5069-1.07(a), 7 the
statutes also provided little guidance on the method to be employed
in the calculation of interest.' Thus, the calculation of the actual
rate of interest involved in a particular transaction has been left to
the courts, and their case-by-case approach to the problem has often
times led to apparently conflicting results? One result of the courts'
ment of article XVI, section 11 in 1960. For-the applicable statutory provisions, see TEx.

REv.

CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02, .04 (Vernon 1971). H.B. 409, effective August 27, 1979, permits

an interest rate on loans for one-to-four family dwelling units not greater than the lesser of
twelve per cent or the rate "equivalent to the average per annum market yields rate adjusted
to constant maturities on 10-year United States Treasury notes and bonds as published by
the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System for the second calendar month preceding the month in which the lender becomes legally bound to make the loans plus an additional
2% per annum rounded off to the nearest quarter of 1%per annum." 1979 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv., ch. 715, § 1, at 1766 (Vernon).
The six percent limitation contained in this section of the constitution and in article
5069-1.03, which is applicable to written contracts and to open accounts, has been subject to
recent litigation. See Houston Sash & Door Co., Inc. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979);
Watson v. Cargill, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ). See also 1974
Opinion Letters from the Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner to members of the Texas
Retail Merchants Association. In Houston Sash & Door the Texas Supreme Court emphasized
that the six percent limitation was subject to the usury penalties of article 5069-1.06 rather
than merely establishing a rate of interest in the absence of an agreement between the parties.
While not a question expressly addressed by the court or apparently raised by either party,
the court may have unintentionally indicated that spreading was inapplicable by its statement that "the interest charged (twelve percent) is in excess of double the amount allowed
by Article 5069-1.03; i.e., in excess of twice zero." Houston Sash & Door Co., Inc. v. Heaner,
577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979). The court has by implication foreclosed the possibility that in a
situation in which the interest charged is one-half percent per month over the term of the
account (both before and after January 1 of the following year) the interest collected during
the period prior to January 1 could be attributed to the period after January 1 in determining whether the interest charged exceeds twice the amount permitted by law. Id. at 221.
However, the result of the court's decision in Houston Sash & Door would have been the
same even if the concept of spreading had been applied in this manner, since the interest
charged during the period after January 1 was exactly twice the maximum permitted by law
and any additional interest in the prior period would cause the total interest during the period
in question to exceed twice the amount permitted over the entire period.
7. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). This statute

will at times be referred to in this article as "article 1.07(a)."
8. The only Texas statute providing for a means of calculation appears to be TEX. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-14.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979), which provides for the use, inter
alia, of the actuarial method.
9. Compare Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchmen's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338 (5th
Cir. 1972) and Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937) with Commerce Trust
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efforts to characterize as principal or interest certain fees charged
by lenders at either the commencement or the early stages of a loan
is the development of the doctrine that has come to be known as the
"spreading of interest."'" To date, the extent of the applicability of
this judicially developed doctrine remains unclear." A determination of the applicability of spreading would be useful in resolving
problems of interest computation in at least four areas of current
concern:
(i) Variable Interest Rate Loans. It is common for the interest rate
for certain loans, such as construction loans, to be expressed as a3
certain number of "points"' 2 in excess of the "prime lending rate.'
Since prime lending rates often vary from month to month," a probCo. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940) and Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley
County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e.
per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974). See section II of this article for a discussion of these
cases.
10. "Spreading" can best be defined as a method of allocating over the life of a loan (or
a portion of the loan, in the event the loan maturity is accelerated or the loan is prepaid)
charges that the parties themselves have called interest or that a court would deem interest
regardless of the label given the charge by the parties. Actually, the term "spreading" is
misleading since interest is not spread; instead a payment is characterized as a payment of
either principal or interest (or both) and then treated accordingly by the courts. See Nevels
v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 198, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1050 (1937). The first usage of the term
"spreading" in an appellate decision appears to have been in Imperial Corp. of America v.
Frenchman's Creek, 190, 198, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1050 (1937). See section 11 at page 759 infra.
11. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
12. A "point" as the term is used in the lending community refers either to (i) an interest
percentage rate of one percent per annum (for example, "two points over prime" would mean
an interest rate two percent higher than the prime lending rate), or (ii) a sum of money equal
to one percent of the loan face amount (for instance, in addition to interest payable under
the loan agreement, a borrower may be required to pay a front-end fee in the amount of a
certain number of points as an inducement to the lender to enter into the loan transaction).
13. There is no one "prime lending rate." Since each institution typically sets its own
prime rate, the prime rate is the actual base rate at which the particular institution will lend
money to its largest and most creditworthy corporate clients.
14. Recently the prime rates of various banks have varied from week to week as seen in
the Wall Street Journal's recent reports:
October 13, 1978
October 24, 1978
November 7, 1978
November 14, 1978
November 27, 1978
December 21, 1978
January 31, 1979
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lem arises in the calculation of the "average" interest rate on such a
loan over its particular term."
(ii) "PrepaidInterest." As a means of increasing the effective yield
in excess of the stated rate of interest for a particular transaction, a
lender will often require that interest be paid prior to its accrual.'
The question arises concerning the treatment of this "prepaid interest.""7
(iii) "Front-EndFees and Points." More common than the lender's
requirement of "prepaid interest" is the requirement that the borrower pay a certain number of points as a fee for making the loan.'"
In Texas, fees paid by the borrower" are to be deducted from the face

Wall Street J. at 1, col. 2 on date indicated.
15. For example, consider a three year loan at nine percent per annum during the first
two years and twelve percent during the third year. What is the "average" rate of interest

over the life of the loan?
16. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84,86-87, 138 S.W.2d 531,532-33 (1940).
17. Is "prepaid interest" really interest? Interest must accrue or accumulate before it is
due. Interest is defined actuarially in terms of an accumulation function. See S. KELLISON,
THE THEORY OF INTEREST 10 (1970). The example of a one year loan of $100 with "interest" of
$9 to be "prepaid" at the beginning of the loan is instructive. From an actuarial point of view,
the term "prepaid interest" is technically incorrect. The $9 actually represents the "amount
of discount," and thus a reduction of the loan amount. Id. at 10. The "amount of discount"
should not be confused with the "rate of discount," which is the ratio of the amount of
discount earned during a year compared to the amount owed at the end of a year. Id. at 1014. In this example the rate of discount is nine percent. The rate of interest, i,and the rate
of discount, d, of a given one-year transaction are related by the formula i = d/(1-d). Here
d = .09, so i = .09/(1-.09) = .098901 or 9.8901%. This may be verified by viewing the above
example as a $91 loan bearing interest of 9.8901% payable at the end of the year. 9.8901%
X $91.00 = $9.00. While a detailed discussion of the rate of discount is beyond the scope of
this article, a more exhaustive treatment may be found in Kellison's work on the theory of
interest. Id. at 10-25.
18. See Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1047-48 (1937).
19. The question of whether "points" paid by a seller of property to a lender lending
purchase money to a purchaser constitute interest is currently being litigated in American
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, Civil No. H-77-833 (S.D. Tex., filed May 31, 1977). On
November 13, 1978, the court denied summary judgment for both parties stating at p. 4-5 of
its order:
[This] court believes that the primary purpose of the Texas usury laws in question is
protection of the borrower from excessive loss or detriment (rather than a prohibition
against lenders from receipt of excessive gain or benefit regardless of the source).
Therefore, the court finds that where such a loan discount is truly - albeit indirectly
- paid by a borrower, the Texas Supreme Court would find such payment to be
interest, such as where the debtor is obligated to reimburse the one making the payment or where the purchase price of property is increased above the market value to
reflect the contemplated payment of a loan discount by the seller to induce the making
of a loan to the buyer.
Id. at 4-5 (Nov. 13, 1978) (order denying motions for summary judgment).
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amount of the loan and the reduced amount is treated as the true
principal. 0
(iv) Refund of Excess Interest Collected. Each of the above practices presumes a specified loan term. In the event the loan term is
shortened, 2 the lender may find himself in the awkward position of
having collected excessive interest during the term of the loan and
therefore he must determine how much of the interest should be
refunded."
Because of the strong penalties for usury2 and the unclear treatment of spreading in past judicial decisions, many lenders began to
lobby for legislative clarification of the spreading doctrine.2 4 Although the 63d Legislature's response, Senate Bill 209,25 was vetoed
by Govenor Briscoe, 5 the 64th Legislature enacted a substantially
20. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937); cf. Tanner Dev.
Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 782, 787 (Tex. 1977) (rule applies only in cash loan transaction).
21. For example, consider (i) a one-year loan in which the entike year's interest is prepaid, but the mortgagee forecloses on the security for the loan after three months because of
a default by the mortgagor or (ii) a loan that provides upon default for the immediate
acceleration of the due dates of all future amounts called for under the terms of the loan.
22. Many loan documents in current use provide that in the event interest in excess of
that permitted by law is ever collected it will automatically be credited against the unpaid
principal balance or refunded to the borrower. This clause has come to be known as a "savings
clause." The purpose of the clause is to prevent the loan transaction from being construed as
usurious. See text accompanying note 235 infra.
23. Prior to the effective date of H.B. 616, August 27, 1979, the penalty for charging
usurious interest is "twice the amount of interest contracted for, charged or received" plus
reasonable attorneys fees. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971). Additionally, in the event that more than double the permitted rate is charged, all principal is
forfeited and the lender is subject to conviction of a misdemeanor and a fine of $1,000. Id.
art. 5069-1.06(2). After the effective date of H.B. 616, the penalty for charging usurious
interest is reduced to three times the amount by which the interest charged, contracted for,
or received exceeds the maximum interest permitted by law, but in no event shall the penalty
be less than the smaller of (i) $2,000 or (ii) 20% of the principal. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.,
ch. 281, § 1, at 604 (Vernon). The bill will be effective regarding all claims of forfeiture made
after the effective date but does not apply to claims in litigation on or before the effective
date of the bill. See id. § 2, at 605.
24. See H.B. 1161, 61st Leg. (1969), which passed the House only to fail in the Senate,
and the bills discussed in text.
25. The title of the Bill was "An Act amending Chapter 1, Title 79, Revised Civil
Statutes of Texas 1925, as amended, by adding a new Article 1.042, providing a general rule
for determination of the rate of interest on real estate loans secured by a lien and authorizing
refund or credit of excess interest charges in the event of premature termination of loans and
relating to real estate loans over $500,000 secured by a lien made by individuals; providing
for prospective application only of this Act; and declaring an emergency." S.B. 209, 63d Leg.
(1973).
26. Proclamation of the Governor of the State of Texas, June 16, 1973, which stated in
part:
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similar bill," House Bill 351, whi'ch is now codified as article 50691.07. 18 Section (b) of this statute"9 increases from ten percent to the
corporate rate 0 the maximum lawful contractual interest rate "on
any loan in the principal amount of $500,000 or more, which is made
for the purpose of interim financing for construction on real property
or financing or refinancing of improved real property."" Section (a)
of this statute, addresses the question of spreading, and provides:
Were the bill in an area less critical to the financial life of the state, I would be
constrained to a clarification by the courts over a period of years. Senate Bill No. 209,
however, deals with a subject so vital both to lending institutions and to borrowers,
that I believe it is wise to await a more carefully drawn codification.
While the veto privilege can be overridden by the legislature, the fact that this bill was passed
at the end of the legislative session effectively precluded any attempt to override the veto. A
brief discussion of the Governor's objection to the bill can be found in Wallenstein, Property,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 28, 43 n.119 (1976). Interestingly enough, that
portion of the bill relating to the spreading of interest introduced into the 63d Legislature
was substantially the same as the presernt article 1.07(a), and it appears that the matter has
now been left to the courts for clarification.
27. No substantive changes from the spreading language of Senate Bill 209 are to be
found. The new bill provided for the creation of article 5069-1.07 instead of an article 50691.042.
28. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).

29. Id. art. 5069-1.07(b).
30. See id. art. 1302-2.09. This article permits loans to certain corporations in excess of
$5,000 to bear an interest rate of one and one-half percent per month. No court has yet
explicitly stated that a rate of one and one-half percent per month is equivalent to eighteen
percent per annum.
31. Id. art. 5069-1.07(b). Section (b) of the statute will not be analyzed in this article.
Any number of unresolved problems concerning the interpretation of this section of the
statute do remain, however. For example, does the wording of the statute exclude a loan
commitment in excess of $500,000 if the loan commitment provides that the first advance
will be less than $500,000? Is that portion of the loan proceeds allocable to the acquisition of
unimproved real property includable in the dollar limitation on a loan that is made for
purposes of both acquisition and construction? Furthermore if that portion is not includable,
is the entire loan amount "tainted" because a single loan has been made? Or, would a court
subtract the acquisition cost, assume that the acquisition portion was not loaned at a rate
greater than ten percent and then compute any excess interest on the remainder of the loan
amount to see if it exceeds the corporate rate? What qualifies as "improved real property?"
Does the language of the statute that refers to "refinancing" limit the amount or financing
to an amount not greater than the existing indebtedness on the property or to an amount not
greater than the original amount of the existing indebtedness? Does the phrase "other than
non-profit corporations" exclude non-profit corporations from borrowing funds at a rate
greater than ten percent per annum, or -is the phrase merely a continuation of the definition
of the rate of interest permissible (i.e., the interest rate allowed for corporations that are not
non-profit)? The latter interpretation is probably the most logical interpretation of the statute. Effective August 27, 1979, a number of problems will have been solved by the passage of
S.B. 10, which lowers the $500,000 amount to $250,000 and provides that the statute is not
applicable to liens on land intended to be used primarily for agricultural or ranching purposes. See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 305, § 1, at 704 (Vernon).
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On any loan or agreement to loan secured or to be secured, in whole
or in part, by a lien, mortgage, security interest, or other interest in
or with respect to any interest in real property, determination of the
rate of interest for the purpose of determining whether the loan is
usurious under all applicable Texas laws shall be made by amortizing, prorating, allocating, and spreading, in equal parts during the
period of the full stated term of the loan, all interest at any time
contracted for, charged, or received from the borrower in connection
with the loan. However, in the event the loan is paid in full by the
borrower prior to the end of the full stated term of the loan and the
interest received for the actual period of the existence of the loan
exceeds the maximum lawful iate, the lender contracting for, charging, or receiving all such interest shall refund to the borrower the
amount of the excess or shall credit the amount of excess against
amounts owing under the loan and shall not be subject to any of the
penalties provided by law for contracting for, charging, or receiving
interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate. 2
Unfortunately the above-quoted language of article 1.07(a) is subject to numerous inconsistent interpretations of doubtful constitutional validity. This article will first summarize the existing case
law on the spreading of interest. It will then suggest, through analysis and comparison of possible interpretations of article 1.07(a), an
interpretation that, if adopted by the courts, would render the statute constitutional.
IX. THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF "SPREADING" PRIOR TO THE
APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 5069-1.07

In order to analyze article 1.07(a) it is necessary to understand the
history of the judicial treatment of spreading. However, an exhaustive analysis of judicial decisions on the question of the spreading
of interest prior to the enactment of the statute will not be attempted since that analysis can be found elsewhere." Accordingly,
32. Id. art. 5069-1.07(a).
33. For an excellent analysis of the judicial development of the concept of spreading, see
Comment, Usury in Texas: SpreadingInterest Over the Entire Period of the Loan, 12 Hous.
L. REv. 159 (1974). Additional analysis can be found in Comment, Usury Implications of
Front-End Interest and Interest in Advance, 29 Sw. L.J. 748 (1975). However, the author of
this article is of the opinion that the economic justifications for a distinction between
"interest-in-advance" and "front-end interest" presented in the latter student work are erroneous. The term "front-end interest" is used in the comment to refer to any fee paid by the
borrower which would be deemed by a court to be a portion of the "cost" of the loan to the
borrower or a portion of the "yield" to the lerider. The term "front-end charge" would be more
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only a synopsis of past judicial decisions is presented to provide the
reader with a background against which the statute can be analyzed.
The earliest judicial expression of the concept of the spreading of
interest by the Texas Supreme Court was in Mills v. Johnston,4 in
which the court stated:
[T]he law in deciding whether a settlement involves usury or not,
will look at the whole amount of interest reserved, as distinct from
such commissions as are allowable and recoverable by law, and to the
whole period of forebearance extended; and if the charges, properly
imputable to interest, do not exceed the highest interest allowed by
law, for the whole period of forebearance, then the settlement cannot
be held to be usurious. 5
Forty-two years later the concept of spreading was used, although
naively and incorrectly, by the Texas Supreme Court in the case of
Galveston & Houston Investment Co. v. Grymes.35 Grymes had entered into a purchase and construction contract for a lot and a house
at a price of $4,215.45. The contract provided that fifty-five percent
interest ($2,318.45) was to be added to this amount and that this
total sum ($6,533.90) would be paid by a series of 120 notes, one note
payable each month, the first in the amount of $55.49 and the remaining 119 in the amount of $54.44.11 Because the monthly payment amount of $54.44 had been computed by dividing the total
sum of $6,533.90 by 120 months, the court interpreted the intention
of the parties to be that each payment represented 1/120th of the
total principal ($35.12) and 1/120th of the total interest ($19.$2).
The court, after calculating the average term of each of the notes
to be five years and fifteen days,"8 multiplied the original purchase
appropriate since the courts do not treat these fees as interest but rather as a reduction of
principal. See Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937). The term
"interest-in-advance" is used in the comment to refer to any amount characterized by the
parties as interest or any amount paid after the commencement of the loan but prior to its
accrual that the court would characterize as interest. This term is also somewhat misleading.
Interest does not exist until it accrues or accumulates. See note 17 supra. The proper economic analysis of an amount of "interest" paid prior to accrual is to consider it a payment of
principal and then base subsequent calculations on the reduced principal. See text accompanying note 217 infra.
34. 23 Tex. 309 (1859).
35. Id. at 330.
36. 94 Tex. 609, 63 S.W. 860 (1901).
37. Since $6,533.90 was not evenly divisible by 120 the remainder of $1.05 was simply
added to the first note due. Id. at 609, 63 S.W. at 860.
38. The court apparently added the terms of all 120 notes to arrive at a total of 7,260
months, which, when divided by the total number of notes (120), yields 60.5 months, or 5
years and 15 days as the average term of a note. See id. at 610, 63 S.W. at 861.
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price of $4,215.45 by ten percent (the maximum non-usurious interest rate) and by the average term of the notes (five years and fifteen
days) to arrive at a figure of $2,125.38, which was deemed by the
court to be the maximum interest that could be charged on
$4,215.45 for a five-year-and-fifteen-day period. Since the interest
charged was $2,318.45, or $193.17 more than that permitted by the
calculations of the court, the contract was held to be usurious."
39. Id. at 610-11, 63 S.W. at 861-62. The court's reasoning was incorrect for two separate
reasons:
(1) Interest is traditionally treated as accruing and payable on an annual basis and, if
not paid annually, is added to principal to be compounded during the following year (i.e.,
compound interest). "Compound interest is used almost exclusively for financial transactions
covering a period of one year or more and is often used for shorter term transactions as well."
S. KELLISON, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 8 (1970). Amortized loans providing for monthly payments are based on a schedule that is compounded monthly. The court, however, applied
simple interest (interest that is never compounded even if not paid annually) for a five-yearand-fifteen-day period to arrive at the total permissible interest. If the court had compounded
interest at the rate of ten percent per annum over the same period, the interest would be
calculated as follows:

Year
1
2
3
4
5
(15 days)

Principal

10% Interest

$4,215.45
4,637.00
5,100.70
5,610.77
6,171.85
6,789.04

Total Interest

$ 421.54
463.70
510.07
561.08
617.19
28.29

Total
Next year's Principal
$4,637.00
5,100.70
5,610.77
6,171.85
6,789.04

$2,601.87

The validity of compounding of interest annually or after the interest has become due
and payable has been recognized by Texas courts. See Miner v. Paris Exchange Bank, 53 Tex.
559, 561 (1880); Mills v. Johnson, 23 Tex. 309, 330 (1859); Bundrick v. First Nat'l Bank, 570
S.W.2d 12, 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); North Tex. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Moore, 82 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1935, writ dism'd). Thus, had the
court taken annual compounding of interest into effect, in all probability the loan would not
have been held to be usurious.
(2) Each payment should first be applied to accrued interest and then to a reduction
of principal, as the lender in this case had contended. The court dismissed this contention
on two grounds, stating that such an application would constitute a reformation of this
contract (since the written agreement of the parties evidenced an intent to allocate the
payments in a different manner) and, secondly, that even if such a method were adopted,
the payments would be insufficient to amortize the loan. See Galveston & Houston Inv. Co.
v. Grymes, 94 Tex. 609, 613-14, 63 S.W. 860, 861-62 (1901). The first contention is persuasively discredited in the dissenting opinion that is discussed in the text accompanying note
116 infra. The second contention is clearly erroneous since a $4,215.45 loan is amortizable in
120 consecutive monthly installments of $54.44 at an annual interest rate of 9.48% as can be
verified by reference to amortization tables.
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Another early Texas case, Seymour Opera-House Co. v.
Thurston,4" also recognized the validity of spreading:
In order to determine whether more than twelve per cent. per annum
interest had been exacted, you should compute the interest on the
sum of money actually paid to the Seymour Opera-House Company
from the time it was loaned up to the maturity of the bond sued on,
and add to it the sum actually paid. You should then add to the
$4,000 bond the note for $400, and all the coupon interest notes up
to the maturity of said bond, and, if the sum of said $4,000 bond and
said $400 note and said coupon notes exceeds the sum actually paid
to said Seymour Opera-House Company and interest thereon at
twelve per cent. per annum as aforesaid, then the transaction would
be illegal and usurious .... 1
The suggestion of the invalidity of spreading was first raised in
the case of Shropshirev. Commerce Farm Credit Co.42 The loan was
structured to provide for twelve percent interest during the first five
years and six percent interest during the last five years through a
series of notes.43 The court of civil appeals first calculated the maximum interest that could be charged on a $4,200 loan to be $420 per
annum. Since $504 was paid at the end of the first year of the loan
(twelve percent of $4,200), the court treated the excess amount
paid, $84, as a payment of principal. The court then based its calculation of the maximum amount of interest that could be collected
during the second year on the reduced principal amount of $4,116.
The same procedure of reducing the principal by the amount of the
payment in excess of the accrued interest was used in the third,
fourth, and fifth years." At the beginning of the sixth year the
40. 45 S.W. 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ ref'd).
41. Id. at 817.
42. 266 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924), rev'd, 280 S.W. 181 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1926), superseded, 120 Tex. 400,30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
43. In this case the borrower executed a ten-year interest-only promissory note for $4,200
with yearly interest coupons of $252 each (six percent) and also five additional notes each in
the amount of $252 maturing successively one each year for the first five loan years. In this
manner, the lender attempted to "squeeze" excessive interest (twelve percent per annum)
into the first five years.
44. These calculations discussed in the text can be summarized as follows:
Intereft
Reduced
Principal
Excess
Payment
at 10%
Year
Principal
1
2
3

$4,200.00
4,116.00
4,023.60

$420.00
411.60
402.36

$ 504.00
504.00
504.00

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss4/5
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principal would be reduced to $3,687.17 and simple interest at the
rate of ten percent per annum on this amount for the five remaining
years would be approximately $1,843.55.11 The court then added the
$2,520 paid during the first five years of the loan (5 x $504), the
$3,687.17 reduced principal balance and the $1,843.55 interest for
the remaining five years to reach a sum of $8,050.72 as the maximum permissible sum payable by the borrower."' Since the total
amount paid by the borrower was only $7,980 [$4,200 + (5 x $504)
+ (5 x $252)],11 the court of civil appeals held the loan to be nonusurious."' The commission of appeals reversed the lower court on
the ground that a contract is usurious if it requires the borrower to
pay interest in excess of the maximum permitted by law for any year
of the term." The supreme court vacated the opinion of the commission of appeals and reversed the court of civil appeals holding that
a loan containing an acceleration clause5 that permitted more than
ten percent interest per annum to be paid on the occurrence of a
default by the borrower was usurious. The supreme court, however,
failed to determine whether a contract would be usurious simply
4

3,921.96

392.20

504.00

111.80

3,810.16

5

3,810.16

381.01

504.00

122.99

3,687.17

$2,520.00

$512.83

Totals

45. 5 x 10% x $3,687.17 = $1,843.55.
46. The total permissible amount of payments would be calculated as follows:

Payments year 1-5; 5 x $504.00

-

Interest at 10% per annum
years 6-10:
Final Principal Payment

-

Total Permissible Payments

=

$2,520.00
1,843.55
3,687.17
$8,050.72

47. The total of the actual payments would be calculated as follows:
Payments years 1-5:
Payments years 6-10:
Repayment of Principal
Total Actual Payments

5 x $504.00
5 x $252.00

-

-

$2,520.00
1,260.00
4,200.00.
$7,980.00

48. Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 266 S.W. 612, 617, rev'd, 280 S.W. 181
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1926), superseded, 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 675 (1931).
49. Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 280 S.W. 181, 182 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1926), superseded, 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
50. An acceleration clause is a clause allowing a lender to "accelerate" the maturity date
of all future payments of a loan upon the borrower's default.
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because excessive interest was charged during the early years of a
loan.5
5 2 did little to clarify
Dallas Trust & Savings Bank v. Brashear
matters. In a transaction similar to Shropshire, but without specific
reference to the presence of an acceleration clause (the apparent
basis for the Shropshire decision), the commission of appeals held
this transaction to be usurious53 stating that interest in excess of ten
percent per annum was paid during the early part of the loan.54
Subsequent decisions are divided on whether the basis of the
Brashear decision hinged upon the presence of an acceleration
clause that would have allowed the collection of interest in excess
of ten percent per annum upon the occurrence of a default by the
bqrrower or whether the basis of the decision hinged upon whether
more than ten percent per annum interest was actually collected.55
Two years after Brashear, the commission of appeals in Adleson
v. B.F. Dittmar Co.5 extended the concept of spreading to front-end
charges in a loan that was self-amortizing.5 7 The borrower executed
a promissory note for $6,000 to be paid in sixty monthly installments
of principal and interest, each installment in the amount of $126.
Based upon evidence presented the court found the interest rate to
be 9.48% per annum.58 As a condition of the loan, however, the
borrower was required to pay to the lender's agent an alleged
"commission" of $240. The court deducted this front-end charge of
$240 from the stated loan amount to arrive at the true principal
51. Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 412, 39 S.W.2d 11, 14 (on
motion for rehearing), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931). For an excellent and extensive
discussion of this case, see Comment, Usury in Texas: Spreading Interest Over the Entire
Period of the Loan, 12 Hous. L. REv. 159, 163-67 (1974).
52. 65 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgmt adopted).
53. Id. at 290.
54. Id. at 292.
55. Compare Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 124 Tex. 556, 560, 81 S.W.2d 1112,
1113 (1935) and Federal Mortgage Co. v. Hawkins, 95 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 131 Tex. 56, 111 S.W.2d 1062 (1938) with Robertson v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 140 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940, no writ)
and Travelers Ins. Co. v. Stiles, 110 S.W.2d 985, 992 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1937, writ
dism'd).
56. 124 Tex. 564, 80 S.W.2d 939 (1935).
57. A self-amortizing loan consists of a series of equal payments (usually paid monthly)
each of which is composed of accrued interest as of the date of payment plus a portion of the
unpaid principal. The amount of the payments is sufficient so that at the end of the loan
term the accrued interest and all of the principal have been repaid.
58. Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 566, 80 S.W.2d 939, 940 (1935). Sixty
monthly payments of $125.95 amortize a $6,000 loan at an interest rate of 9.48% per annum.
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amount of the loan, $5,760.-I The court then found the true rate of
interest based upon a principal amount of $5,760 to be 11.268% per
annum.60

In Nevels-v. Harris" the Texas Supreme Court gave its sanction
to the approach used in Brashear.The borrower had executed a note
in the principal sum of $6,400 due in five years with interest payable
annually in the amount of $512 (eight percent of the face amount
of the note). Because the lender deducted $320 for making the loan,
the court held that the true principal actually received by the borrower was $6,080.2 The court then computed that the maximum
lawful interest that could be collected on $6,080 at ten percent for
five years was $3,040. This amount added to the repayment of principal of $6,080 would call for a total repayment of $9,120, the maximum that the borrower could legally repay. The court then compared this amount to the amount actually to be paid by the borrower, $8,960, 1 and concluded that the loan was not usurious.4
Three years after Nevels, however, in Commerce Trust Co. v.
Ramp"5 the commission of appeals was confronted with essentially
the same fact situation as Shropshire' Ramp involved a $50,000 loan
for a term of ten years evidenced by one note at six and one-half
percent interest per annum and four notes (one due each year for
the first four years of the loan term) that in the aggregate represented an additional two and one-half percent interest per annum
59. Id. at 566, 80 S.W.2d at 940.
60. Id. at 566, 80 S.W.2d at 940. Sixty monthly payments of $126.01 amortize a $5,760
loan at an interest rate of 11.268% per annum. This method of analysis was then followed in
Eubanks v. Simpson, 90 S.W.2d 291, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ refd) ($1,500
loan with front-end charge of $70, repayable in 120 self-amortizing monthly installments of
$18.75 held not usurious).
61. 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937). See also Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972), where the Fifth Circuit held that a $67,500
"commitment fee" was actually interest and should be deducted from the stated amount of
principal to arrive at the true principal received.
62. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937). The court in its
reformulation of the loan as a loan for $6,080 characterized the $320 front-end charge as a
reduction of principal rather than as additional interest. But cf. First State Bank v. Miller,
563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978). In Miller the supreme court erroneously treated a front-end
charge as both a reduction of principal and interest. Id. at 575.
63. The $8,960 was composed of the $2,560 interest actually charged (5 x $512 per year)
and the $6,400 repayment of the principal face amount. The $320 front-end charge was not
an additional payment but merely a reduction of the amount advanced, but the amount was
nevertheless repaid at the end of the loan term as part of the $6,400 repayment.
64. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 197, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937).
65. 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1940).
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for the term of the loan." Without citing any authority for its con-

clusion, the commission held that when additional interest was
"squeezed" into the early years of a loan thereby causing interest
in excess of ten percent per annum to be collected during the early
part of the loan, the loan was usurious. 7
The holding of Ramp was apparently reaffirmed in Southwestern
Investment Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc.,6" when
the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals held that a transaction is usurious if the payment of interest required is in excess of ten percent
over any one year period. In response to a flood of amicus curiae
briefs, the supreme court refused writ 9 with a per curiam "no reversible error" that expressly noted that the court was expressing no
opinion on the question of the spreading of front-end charges over
the life of a loan.70
In 1977 the Texas Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Tanner Development Co. v. Ferguson.7 In purchasing a tract of
land, on November 8, 1973, Ferguson paid $6,000 down and executed a non-recourse "wrap-around"" note for $226,338.77 on which
66. The 61/2% interest on the $50,000 note was broken down into ten interest coupons
for $3,250 (61/2% per annum) and the additional four promissory notes were in the amount of
$3,125 each (4 x $3,125/10 years = 2-12%).
67. Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1940).
68. 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d
136 (Tex. 1974).
69. Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 516 S.W.2d 136
(Tex. 1974).
70. Id. at 137. One interpretation of the differing judicial treatments of spreading is
based on the existence of a savings clause. In Nevels, in which spreading was allowed, the
court distinguished Shropshireon the basis of the savings clause contained in the Nevels note.
Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 197, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937). Both Nevels and Shropshire
contained acceleration clauses but Nevels also contained a clause that specifically provided
for cancellation of all unearned interest, if repayment were accelerated. In Ramp, however,
the court of civil appeals had held that a review of the acceleration clause of the loan was
unnecessary since the loan provided for interest in excess of ten percent being paid in any
one year. Commerce Farm Credit Co. v. Ramp, 116 S.W.2d 1144, 1149 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1938), aff'd sub nom., Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d
531 (1940). The commission failed to comment on the presence of an acceleration clause,
holding the loan to be usurious because interest in excess of ten percent per annum was
required by the loan during the first four years of the term of the loan. Id. at 87, 138 S.W.2d
at 533. The Fifth Circuit in Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchmen's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d
1338 (5th Cir. 1972), attempted to resolve this inconsistency in Texas case law on the basis
of the existence of a savings clause, interpreting Texas law as permitting spreading in cases
in which the documents contain a savings clause. Id. at 1344-45.
71. 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).,
72. In a "wrap-around" mortgage the lender or seller issues a new mortgage to the
purchaser of the property by advancing to the purchaser the difference between the principal
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he immediately prepaid one year's interest in the amount of
$21,506.43. Upon the purchaser's insistence, 3 the seller agreed to
accept the prepaid interest in lieu of a larger down payment. The
stipulated rate of interest was nine and one-half percent per annum
to be paid quarterly in advance on the 20th day of January, April,
July, and October of each calendar year beginning on January 20,

1974, and continuing through July 20, 1977, during which time payment on the principal was deferred. Additionally, the note provided

that after July 20, 1977, no interest was to be paid until all prepaid
interest was credited to the note, so that during the first year, the
contract called for interest payments in excess of ten percent of the
principal. The note contained a savings clause that provided that

in the event of prepayment or the acceleration of maturity any
interest in excess of the lawful rate would be considered as a payment of principal and so credited to the note.
amount of the loan and the previously existing indebtedness on the property and assuming
the responsibility for repayment of the previously existing indebtedness to the extent of
payments received from the debt service on the "wrap-around" mortgage. Interest is charged
on the full face amount of the "wrap-around" note and the "wrap-around" mortgagee in turn
pays all interest on the previously existing indebtedness. Gunning, The Wrap-Around Mortgage... Friend or UF.O.?, 2 REAL EsT. REV. 35 (1972); see Galowitz, How to Use Wraparound Financing,5 RAL EST. L.J. 107 (1976); Hershman, Usury and a "New Look" in Real
Estate Financing, 4 RAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 315, 323-24 (1969); Note, Wrap-Around
Financing:A Technique for Skirting the Usury Laws?, 1972 DUKE L.J. 785, 787. Interestingly,
Tanner appears to be the first case involving a wrap-around mortgage in which a Texas court
has been called upon to determine the true principal amount of the loan. While the supreme
court indicated that in a seller-financed situation in which the purchaser receives the "full
benefit" of the land the true principal is the face amount of the loan, the opinion indirectly
indicates that if the wrap-around financing had been supplied by a third party lender, the
loan would have been usurious since under Nevels, the true principal would be the actual
amount advanced (i.e., the difference between the face amount of the note and the unpaid
balance of the underlying notes). Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 782, 786 (Tex.
1977). See generally Valachi, CalculatingTrue Yields on Wraparounds, 6 REAL EST. REV. 92
(1977); Note, Wrap Around Financing:A Technique for Skirting the Usury Laws?, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 785. It remains a question whether the same result would be reached under article 50691.07(b) if the actual amount advanced is $400,000 but a wrap-around note for $1,000,000 is
executed upon the lender's agreement to satisfy the payment of the existing indebtedness in
the unpaid principal amount of $600,000. It is arguable that from the borrower's perspective,
he had in essence refinanced the property in an amount exceeding $500,000, and that whether
the lender paid off the existing indebtedness at the time of consummation of the loan or
merely continued making the debt service payments on the underlying indebtedness should
be irrelevant to the borrower since the lender is now responsible for satisfaction of the underlying indebtedness. Unfortunately, the Tanner decision indicates that the statute 'may not
eventually be interpreted in this manner.
73. The purchaser's investors wished to obtain immediate tax deductions for prepaid
interest. Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. 1977).
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The court of civil appeals,7 4 after a lengthly analysis of Texas case
law, cited Nevels as support for spreading and, in following the
Nevels approach, deducted the prepaid interest from the total principal in order to arrive at the amount of money on which Tanner
was due interest ($204,881.84). But in determining the interest payable over the term of the note, the court included the $21,506.93
prepayment that it had also deducted from the principal." By misapplying the Nevels approach in this manner, the court concluded
that the interest, even when spread over the five-year period, caused
the contract to be usurious.
The supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals, holding
that it was error to count the prepayment as both principal and interest. The supreme court treated the prepayment as interest rather
than as a reduction of principal." While apparently approving of
Nevels to the point of overruling Ramp and Hockley to the extent
that they were in conflict,77 the court did not apply Nevels but
74. Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Lst Dist.]
1976), rev'd, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
75. Id. at 490-91. According to the terms of the loan, the court first calculated the total
of all interest that was to be paid over the life .of the loan and found this amount to be
$106,520.46, which included the $21,506.93 "prepaid interest" paid on the closing of the
transaction. The court then proceeded to treat this $21,506.93 also as a reduction of principal
to arrive at a "true principal" of $204,881.84. Based upon this reduced principal, the court
calculated that only $101,442.67 interest at ten percent could be collected over the life of the
loan, and since more than this amount was contracted for, the loan was usurious. In reaching
this conclusion, however, the court of civil appeals erroneously interpreted Nevels. In Nevels,
although the front-end charge was deducted from the principal amount, the interest was not
included in the total amount of interest in the first year. In Nevels the face amount of the
loan was $6,400, from which $320 (the "front-end charge") was deducted to arrive at the sum
of $6,080 as the amount actually loaned. The court determined that the maximum interest
allowable on the $6,080 would be $3,040 for five years for a total of $9,120 as the maximum
that could be repaid. The court then added the $2,560 interest actually charged to the $6,400
(this is composed of the true principal of $6,080 plus an additional interest charge of $320
which results from the repayment of the stated principal which was $320 greater than the
actual principal advanced) to arrive at a total of $8,960. The $2,560 constituted the eight
percent interest per annum ($512 interest for each five years) and did not include the $320
prepaid interest. If the $320 in Nevels had been included as interest, as the court of civil
appeals tried to do in Tanner, the loan would have been usurious. The total amount paid by
the borrower would have been $9,280-clearly exceeding the maximum amount allowable
($9,120) based on the $6,080 "actually loaned." The treatment of a front-end charge both as
interest and as a reduction of principal has sometimes been referred to as the "double dip"
theory. The Texas Supreme Court a year later used the vdouble dip" theory in First State
Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. 1978). For an example in another jurisdiction of
the use of this "double dip" theory, see Otis v. 1. Eisner Co., 46 P.2d 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).
76. Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 787 (Tex. 1977).
77. "Insofar as the opinion in Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, supra, is in conflict with
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rather distinguished Tanner from Nevels on the ground that Tanner
involved the sale of real estate with a loan from the seller, while
Nevels involved a loan of money. 8 The court justified this distinction by stating that since in a sale of land the debtor has the full
use and benefit of the principal (the land) during the term of the
loan, the true principal sum of the note was the stated face
amount. 9
With regard to spreading, the court, after holding article 1.07(a)
to be inapplicable,"0 stated that interest in advance and front-end
this opinion, it is overruled. Likewise, the conflicting holding of the Court of Civil Appeals
in Southwestern Investment Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., supra, is disapproved." Id. at 787.
78. Id. at 787. This distinction seems to leave open the possibility for a seller to extract
a higher yield from a loan at the expense of the purchaser than could a third party lender.
Consideration of the following situation is instructive: S is willing to sell property for $1,000
cash or for $1,100 payable in the form of a one-year promissory note in the amount of $1,100
bearing interest at the rate of ten percent. Under this situation if P accepts the loan from S,
P pays $1,210 ($1,100 principal plus $110 interest). If, however, financing is available at
eleven percent per annum from a bank, then except for the application of the usury laws, P
could buy the property from S for cash of $1,000 and only pay $1,110 to finance the purchase.
It appears that the court would hold the latter transaction to be usurious and the former nonusurious. For this reason, the court's distinction is questionable if the purpose of the usury
laws is to protect the borrower.
79. Id. at 787. The court of civil appeals had rejected this argument when raised by
Tanner.
We see no distinction. The note required compensation to be paid not for the use of
money but for the forebearance or detention of money, that is, the balance of the
purchase price due for the land sold to the trustee. When Tanner Development required that one year's advance interest be paid at the time of the closing of the
transaction, the amount of money on which they are due interest must be reduced by
the same amount to determine the amount of money that Tanner Development Company was permitting Ferguson to detain.
Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1976), rev'd, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
80. Although the court did not apply article 1.07(a), the court implied that there was
some question whether or not the statute could be applied retroactively: "In any event, under
the points as presented in this appeal we are not required to determine whether Article 50691.07(a) should be considered, and we decide the case without regard to Article 5069-1.07(a)."
Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 786 (Tex. 1977). In footnote 12 to its opinion
the court commented on the failure of Tanner to assert the applicability of the new statute
either on the grounds of its retroactivity or through its interpretation in pari materia with
articles 5069-1.04 and 1.06. The footnote cited Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 932, 944-48 (1949). The
annotation refers to Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143 (1883) as an exception to the general rule
that statutes changing the interest rate will not be applied retroactively to validate agreements usurious when made. In Ewell the United States Supreme Court interpreted a Texas
constitutional amendment repealing a statute providing a defense of usury: "the repeal of
such laws, without a saving clause, operated retroactively so as to cut off the defence [sic]
for the future, even in actions upon contracts previously made." Id. at 150. In Southwestern
Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724, 731 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974), the appellate court

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 4, Art. 5

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10: 753

interest should not be distinguished.5 ' Relying on Nevels2 the court
emphasized that to impose the penalties for usury "solely upon
proof that one year's interest payments exceeded the statutory
limit, where over the effective period of the contract, [the total]
interest payments were not in excess of the amount authorized by
law"" would be manifestly unfair and unjust and beyond the obvious intent of the legislature in the enactment of article 5069-1.061,
and by the 1967 legislative amendment to article 5069-1.06 which
extended the usury penalties to interest "contracted for" during the
entire term of a note. "[I]t seems only reasonable that [the legislature] intended for the contract to be tested for usury on the basis
of the compensation charged for the entire term during which the
borrower had the use, detention or forbearance of the principal
debt."5
However, in the last laragraphs of the decision, the court appears
to have limited its opinion to contracts
wherein the stated rate of interest on the principal debt does not
exceed 10% per annum and wherein all consideration (contracted for
and judicially determined) for use, detention or forbearance of the
principal debt is a sum no greater than such principal debt would
produce at 10% per annum during the full time that the payor has
use of the principal debt or the consideration (such as land) which is
represented by the principal debt."6
cited the general rule that the question whether a contract is usurious is to be determined as
of the time of its inception. See Seymour Opera-House Co. v. Thurston, 45 S.W. 815, 817
(Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ ref'd). While it might be argued, as Tanner suggests, that the new
statute could be interpreted in pari materia with the other usury statutes, section 3 of the
act adding article 1.07(a) provides: "This Act applies from and after its effective date prospectively and does not have any application to any right or duty, contract, obligation, cause
of action, or claim of defense arising prior to its effective date." 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 26,
§ 3, at 48. Since usury is judged as of the inception of a loan, if article 1.07(a) is ultimately
interpreted not to apply to loans made prior to September 1, 1975, the new statute may not
be effective to save usurious loans made prior to September 1, 1975, even though the loan is
renewed subsequent to that date. The Texas courts have held that a renewal promissory note
may be tainted with the usury of the original note. Skeen v. Slavik, 555 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
81. Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 785 (Tex. 1977).
82. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
83. Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 787 (Tex. 1977).
84. TEx. Rsv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971).
85. Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 786 (Tex. 1977).
86. Id. at 787. It is at least arguable that Tanner might permit fluctuating interest rates
which at times exceed the maximum permitted rate to be "spread" over the entire term of
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Because of this statement by the court, it is difficult to assess to

what extent, if any, Ramp has been overruled.87 The court's opinion
on motion for rehearingO8 did little to clarify its holding. The court
merely reiterated its distinction between cash loan transactions and
real estate sales for the purposes of treating the "prepaid interest"
as either a reduction of principal or as interest.89
the loan. See id. at 784. See especially the favorable quote from Mills v. Johnston, 23 Tex.
308, 329-30 (1859):
The law, in deciding whether a settlement involves usury or not, will look at the whole
amount of interest reserved. . . and to the whole period of the forbearance extended;
and if the charges, properly imputable to interest, do not exceed the highest interest
allowed by law, for the whole period of forbearance, then the settlement cannot be held
to be usurious."
Id. at 330 (emphasis supplied). This interpretation would require that the phrase "during
the full time that the payor has the use of the principal debt or the consideration (such as
land) which is represented by the principal debt," quoted in the text, modifies not only the
immediately preceding clause, but also the clause "wherein the stated rate of interest on the
principal debt does not exceed 10% per annum." See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561
S.W.2d 777, 787 (Tex. 1977).
87. Ramp involved one note with a stated rate of interest of 612% and four additional
notes of $3,125 bearing no interest until maturity which totaled an additional 21/2% of the
total loan amount and which matured on the first four anniversaries of the loan. It can be
argued that the "stated rate of interest" in Ramp did not exceed ten percent per annum, in
which case Ramp .would fall outside the scope of the court's opinion. See Commerce Trust
Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1940).
88. Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 787 (Tex. 1977) (on motion for rehearing).
89. Since this case involves no loan of money, and our opinion distinguishes the
nature of the principal debt from a loan of money, we doubt the necessity of disclaiming it as a precedent for testing money loans from which interest or other front-end
payments have been deducted by the lender or returned to the lender. To make this
abundantly clear, however, we reiterate that in cash loan transactions from which the
lender deducts interest, fees, commissions or other front-end charges, the amount of
dollars actually received or retained by the borrower is held to be "true" principal. In
such cases the amount of the stated principal is reduced accordingly in testing for
usury. See Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937), and our statement
of this rule in our opinion of October 19, 1977.
Id. at 787. The court also disposed of Ferguson's argument that Tanner's notices of acceleration and demand constituted a "charging" of interest under article 5069-1.06. The court held
that because Tanner's demand referred only to the principal "balance" rather than a specific
sum or the full face amount of the note, he was not necessarily "charging" interest; that the
letters could be construed "as referring to whatever balance was due on the principal after
applying all payments and credits under the terms of the note." Id. at 789. Additionally, the
note contained a savings provision; thus, any unearned interest payments would be credited
on the principal in determining the "balance." The court in the motion for rehearing stressed
that the loan involved no personal liability and the sole recourse of the seller was against the
property. Id. at 788. The question arises whether the court would have reached a different
conclusion if the loan had been one with personal liability. If so, would this distinction be
applicable to a loan from a third party secured only by property?
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The court's opinion is susceptible to various interpretations. Although the distinction the court makes between land sales and cash
loan transactions is a novel one, it is important to note, as the court
did, that the contract provisions for the prepaid interest were included solely at the insistence of the purchaser-borrower. The court
may have grasped at this distinction in order to reach an equitable
result on these particular facts.
Because article 1.07(a) did not apply to this loan contract," ' the
court's limitation of its opinion is not necessarily a limitation of the
application of the statute, but rather represents the court's interpretation of existing case law arising prior to the application of the
statute. Additionally, the impact of Tanner on loans arising prior
to the enactment of article 1.07(a) is as yet uncertain because of its
unique fact pattern."
Finally, in First State Bank v. Miller 2 the Texas Supreme Court
again approved Nevels but then proceeded to misapply its holding.
In Miller the borrower signed a three year note for $70,000 bearing
interest at the rate of ten percent per annum. Interest for the first
two years ($14,000) was frozen in a non-interest-bearing account
with the lender, however, resulting in the borrower receiving effectively only $56,000. The court then computed the maximum amount
chargeable on $56,000 for three years to be $16,800, then compared
this with the interest called for on the face of the note ($21,000) and
held the contract to be usurious. 3 The court's error in applying
Nevels was in treating the frozen interest as both a reduction of
principal and as interest. 4 A correct application of the principles set
90. Id. at 786.
91. The exact fact situation in Tanner has been rendered almost obsolete by the recent
changes in tax laws, which have substantially eliminated the deductions for prepaid interest
formerly available under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Provisions of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, now embodied in § 461(g) of the Internal Revenue Code, require a taxpayer using
the cash basis method of accounting to capitalize prepaid interest and allow deduction of that
interest only in the taxable years in which that interest "is properly allocable" as a charge
for the use or forbearance of money. These provisions apply to prepayment of interest on or
after January 1, 1976, except prepayments made before January 1, 1977, pursuant to a
binding contract or written loan commitment in effect on September 16, 1976. See Aronsohn,
Real Estate Investments After the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 4 J. REAL EST. TAX. 99 (1977).

92. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
93. Id. at 575.
94. This is the "double dip" theory referred to at note 75 supra, and a procedure the
Texas Supreme Court specifically disapproved of in Tanner: "It is an obvious error in these
calculations to count the $21,506.93 prepayment as both principal and interest." Tanner Dev.
Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 782 (Tex. 1977).
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forth in Nevels would be as follows: (1) the true principal amount
of 'the loan was $56,000; (2) three years simple interest on $56,000
at ten percent equals $16,800; (3) the total permissible repayment
of this loan would therefore be $72,800 ($56,000 + $16,800); (4) since
the total repayments of the borrower equaled $77,000 ($70,000 representing the stated principal amount of the loan and $7,000 representing the stated amount of the interest for the third year) and this
amount was greater than the maximum lawful amount of $72,800,
the loan was usurious. The conclusion is the same even if the effect
of compounding is included. 5
III.

ECONOMIC REALITY IN LOAN TRANSACTIONS

It is the contention of this author that any confusion created by
the existing cases regarding the application of the concept of spreading of interest could be avoided by a case-by-case analysis of the
economic reality of the loan transaction. Accordingly, in any analysis, the substance of a loan transaction should control over the form
into which the transaction has been cast by the parties. Texas courts
in past usury cases have evidenced a willingness to adopt such an
analysis through disregard of the labels placed by the parties upon
certain charges for the determination of whether those charges constitute interest or a reduction of principal. For example, the Texas
Supreme Court has held that a "premium," statutorily mandated
not to be interest, actually constituted interest." The supreme court
has also held that a "loan fee" paid by the borrower at the commencement of the loan should be treated as a reduction of principal
and not interest. 7 A fee denominated an "origination fee" was
deemed by a Houston court of civil appeals to be interest. 8 Similar
examples involving "closing fees,"" "commitment fees,"'"" "broker95. Interest at the rate of ten percent per annum compounded annually on $56,000 for
three years would amount to $18,536 ([(1.1)1 x $56,000] - $56,000). The total permissible
repayment with compounding would therefore be $74,536 ($18,536 interest plus the $56,000
true principal), still less than the $77,000 repayment the loan required the borrower to pay.
96. Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1976).
For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying note 129 infra.
97. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937).
98. Terry v. Teachworth, 431 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99. Riverdrive Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 515 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("closing fee" held to constitute interest).
100. Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th
Cir. 1972) ("commitment fee" held to be interest rather than bona fide commitment fee). See
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age fees,"'' and "service charges"'' 2 can be found.
Since the calculation of interest is fundamental to any determiriation of usury, the adoption of a uniform method of calculation that
provides certainty in the determination of the true rate of interest
would be advantageous. Ideally, such a method should be based
upon the substance of the loan transaction rather than its form.
Article 1.07(a) presents the opportunity for the adoption of a
method of calculation of interest that would yield certainty to each
transaction and reflect the true economics of the transaction. Prior
to the analysis of this proposed method of calculation, some of the
present inconsistencies in the calculation of interest prior to the
applicability of article 1.07(a) will be demonstrated by way of exam03
ple.1
Example 1. L loans $100 to D conditioned upon D's execution of a
promissory note in the principal amount of $100 payable as follows:
(i) At the commencement of the loan one interest "point" ($1.00), (ii)
at the end of the first year, interest at the rate of 9.1% of the face
amount ($9.10) and (iii) at the end of the second year, interest at the
rate of 8.9% of the face amount ($8.90) together with repayment of
the face amount of principal of $100 for a total of $108.90.1"
Although one interest point when added to 9.1% interest produces
10.1% interest in the first year, the loan would not be usurious, since
under Nevels'1 a court, rather than treat the point as interest,
would consider it a repayment of principal and compute the interest
based on the reduced principal, as illustrated in Example 2 (which
is a restructuring of Example 1 similar to that which a court would
perform).'"
also Laid Rite, Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 512 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1974, no writ).
101. Morris v. Maglicco, 468 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("brokerage fee" held to be subterfuge); cf. Home Sav. Ass'n v. Crow,
514 S.W.2d 160, 167-68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974), aff'd, 522 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. 1975)
($25,000 bona fide brokerage fee).
102. Thrift Fin. Co. v. State, 351 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) ("service charge" held to constitute interest).
103. Many examples will be used throughout this article. The reader is urged to work
through each example in order to gain a firm understanding of the concepts involved.
104. The calculations are as follows:

Net Loan proceeds:
Payments (Year 1):
Payment (Year 2):

$100.00 -

$1.00

.091 X $100.00
(.089 x $100.00)

-

+

$100.00

=

$ 99.00
$ 9.10
$108.90

105. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937).
106. Technically, the court would reason as follows: (1) The true amount of the loan in
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Example 2. L loans $99 to D conditioned upon D's execution of a
promissory note in the principal amount of $99 and payable as follows: At the end of the first year, interest at the rate of 9.19% ($9.10)
and at the end of the second year, interest at the rate of ten percent
together with repayment of the original $99 principal ($9.90 + $99.00
= $108.90). 07

Since the interest rate during each year of the transaction is never
greater than ten percent, this transaction is not usurious.
Unfortunately, substance-over-form analysis has not been used in
every loan situation by the Texas courts, as is demonstrated by the
next two examples.
Example 3. L loans $100 to D conditioned upon D's execution of a
promissory note in the principal amount of $100 and payable as follows: At the end of the first year, fifteen percent interest ($15) is due
and at the end of the second year, four percent interest ($4) is due
t
together with the repayment of the original $100 principal.' 0

It appears that under prevailing case law (not considering article
1.07(a)) the loan would be usurious since the stated rate of interest
would be in excess of ten percent per annum during the first year
of the loan.'"
Example 1 was $99; (2) At ten percent interest, the highest legal rate, the interest on $99 for
one year would be $9.90, and ten percent interest for the two-year period the loan was to run
would amount to $19.80; (3) This sum added to the principal actually loaned, $99 would
aggregate $118.90; (4) The sum $118.90 is the maximum amount L could have legally charged
and unless the loan calls for the payment of more than the total amount, it is not usurious;
(5) D paid $9.10 in first year, $8.90 in the second year, along with the $100 principal totaling
$118 and therefore the loan is not usurious. Id. at 196, 102 S.W.2d at 1049; see Adleson v.
B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 566, 80 S.W.2d 939, 940 (1935); Eubanks v. Simpson, 90
S.W.2d 291, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ ref'd).
107. The calculations are as follows:
Net loan proceeds:

Payments (Year 1): .0919 X $99.00
Payments (Year 2): (.10 x $99.00) + $99.00
Total Payments
108. The calculations are as follows:
Net loan proceeds
Payments (Year 1): .15 x $100.00
Payments (Year 2): (.04 x $100.00) + $100.00

$ 99.00

-

Actual

Permitted

=

$ 9.10
$108.90

$ 9.90
$108.90

-

$118.00

$118.80

-

$100.00
$ 15.00
$104.00

109. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 533 (1940);
Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724, 732 (Tex.
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Example 4. L loans $100 to D conditioned upon D's execution of a
promissory note in the principal amount of $100 and payable as follows: At the end of the first year, ten percent interest ($10) together
with a principal reduction payment of $5 and at the end of the second
year, interest on the remaining $95 principal at the rate of 9.47% ($9)
together with the $95 remaining principal."'

This loan would not be usurious since the stated rate of interest is
less than ten percent per annum during each year of the loan.
In both of these examples, L received from D $15 at the end of
the first year and $104 at the end of the second year. Although the
two loans are indistinguishable economically, the loan in Example
3 is usurious while the loan in Example 4 is not.
While the courts would restructure Example 1 into Example 2, no
court has indicated a willingness to hold that a loan in the form of
Example 3 is equivalent to a loan in the form of Example 4. Although at least one student commentary"' has attempted to justify
this inconsistency in treatment, in reality no logical, economic justification exists for a distinction between Examples 3 and 4. While
in Examples 3 and 4 the form of the transaction controls, in Examples 1 and 2 the court looks beyond the form to the substance of the
transaction."' From an economic analysis Examples 3 and 4 should
be treated in the same manner as Examples 1 and 2.
Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974). Tanner Dev.
Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 787 (Tex. 1977) appears to be inapplicable since the stated
rate of interest during the first year is in excess of ten percent. See id. at 787. But see note 86
supra.
110. The calculations are as follows:
Net loan proceeds

Payments (Year 1): (.10 x $100.00) + $5.00
Payments (Year 2): (.947 x $95.00) + $95.00
Total Payments

=

=
=

$100.00
Actual

Permitted

$ 15.00
$104.00

$ 10.00
$110.00

$119.00

$120.00

111. Comment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest and Interest In Advance, 29
Sw. L.J. 748 (1975). But see Comment, Usury in Texas: Spreading Interest Over the Entire
Period of the Loan, 12 Hous. L. REv. 159, 176 (1974).
112. One possible explanation of this difference in treatment may be that the level of
sophistication of the courts in the 1930's regarding computation of interest may have been
sufficient to analyze a loan involving a simple front-end fee, but not adequate to analyze an
amortized loan with prepaid interest. The ability for individuals without an actuarial background to analyze the latter has only recently been facilitated by the availability of calculators and computers. Without these devices, resort must be made to complex actuarial computation functions and formulae.
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Similar to the preceding two examples, the form of the next two
examples would be deemed by the courts to control over the substance of the transactions.
Example 5. L lends D $1,000 to be paid as follows: (i) interest only
at the rate of 15.58% per annum during the first three years with
payment of accrued interest at the end of each year; (ii) interest at
the rate of 9.074% per annum during the fourth year payable together
with a principal payment of $65.08 at the end of that year; (iii)
principal payments of $155.82 at the end of each of years five through
ten, the loan being without interest after the fourth year."'
This loan would be deemed by the courts to be usurious because
more than ten percent interest per annum was collected in each of
the first three years of the loan."'
Example 6. D borrows $1,000 from L at nine percent interest, interest
and principal to be amortized over a ten-year period with ten equal
annual payments of $155.82."1
113. The loan can be summarized as follows:

Year

Beginning
Principal

Total
Payment

Interest
Payment

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

$1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
934.92
779.10
623.28
467.46
311.64
155.82

$155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82

$155.82
155.82
155.82
90.74
-

-

Principal
Payment
-

65.08
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82

End of Year
Resulting
Principal
$1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
934.92
779.10
623.28
467.46
311.64
155.82
0.00

114. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 533 (1940);
Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724, 732 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e, per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974). Since no sale
of land was involved, Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977), would appear
to be inapplicable.
115. This loan can be summarized as follows:

Year

Beginning
Principal

Total
Payment

1
2
3

$1,000.00
934.18
862.44

$155.82
155.82
155.82

91,
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Accrued
Interest
$90.00
84.08
77.62

Principal
Payment
$ 65.82
71.74
78.20

End of Year
Resulting
Principal
$934.18
862.44
784.24
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This loan would not be deemed usurious because at no time is more
than ten percent interest per annum being charged. Although the
cash flow from D to L in Example 6 is identical to that of Example
5, Example 5 above would be construed to be usurious under existing law. This comparison illustrates the illogic of construing a loan
usurious merely because of the labels attached to the charges by the
parties.
Ironically, the clearest judicial statement in Texas on the logical
inconsistency in the diverse treatment of Examples 5 and 6 is found
in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Gaines in the early case
of Galveston & Houston Investment Co. v. Grymes."I In his dissent,
the Chief Justice constructed two hypothetical examples. In the
first example, A lends $1,000 to C,11 which is to be repaid in equal
monthly installments over a ten year period bearing interest at the
highest lawful rate (ten percent per annum) to be paid in each
installment on the then remaining unpaid principal. The amount of
the monthly installment is then calculated in order to amortize this
indebtedness over the ten year period and a promissory note is given
for each installment." 8 In the second example, B loans $1,000 to C
to be repaid in monthly installments exactly equal to the amount
of the monthly installments in the first example, but the parties
agree that each note (i.e., each monthly payment) shall be applied
to the payment of interest only to the extent of the proportion that
the total interest bears to the total principal payable over the life
of the loan."' Commenting on the majority's decision, the dissent
states:
A and B each lend C the same sum of money and C gives each of them
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

784.24
699.00
606.90
504.82
394.43
274.11
142.96

155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82
155.82

70.58
62.91
54.55
45.55
35.50
24.67
12.87

85.24
92.91
101.27
110.39
120.32
131.15
142.95

699.00
606.90
504.00
394.43
274.11
142.96
0.01

116. 94 Tex. 609, 63 S.W. 860 (1901).
117. The figure of $1,000 has been selected by the author for simplicity.
118. The amount of each note would be $13.22 as can be verified by reference to amortization tables or calculated in the manner set forth at note 156 infra.
119. The total interest payable on all of the notes would be $586.40 as can be calculated
by the formula set forth at note 163 infra. Thus in the second example, the interest portion
of each note would be $586.40/$1000.00 = 58.64%, regardless of the date the note was due,
and the remaining 41.36% of each note would be attributable to a repayment of principal.
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120 notes for precisely the same amount for the payment of the loan
with interest. A's loan is lawful, B's is usurious. If interest is compensation for the use of money, can it be that this first contract is legal
and the second illegal as to the interest, when the same sum of money
is lent in each case and is contracted to be repaid in 120 installments
each of the same amount? The law looks to the substance of contracts
and not to their form, and this principle is frequently applied in
dealing with contracts claimed to be usurious. . . . If the substance
of the contract is to be looked to, I do not see how it can be held that
the contract in the first case supposed is lawful, while that in the
20
second is unlawful.

Two more examples of the application of the concept of form over
substance should be noted.
Example 7. D desires to purchase from L land valued at $100. L
structures the loan whereby D gives L a promissory note for $100 at
eight percent interest per annum due in three years and requires
interest for three years to be prepaid at closing.

This loan would not be held usurious since it involves the sale of
land. 121
120. Galveston & Houston Inv. Co. v. Grymes, 94 Tex. 609, 617, 63 S.W. 860, 865 (1901)
(dissenting opinion). Situation B represents the fact situation in Grymes in which the loan
amount was $4,215.45 and the total interest added on was $2,318.45. The total was divided
into 120 notes maturing on successive months each in the amount of $54.44. The majority
opinion reasoned as follows: the maximum interest permissible is computed by multiplying
the maximum permissible interest rate, the original loan amount, and the average term of
the notes.
Total term of the notes f 1 + 2 + . . . + 120 = 7,260 months
Average term of a note f 7,260/120 f 60.5 months
Maximum permissible interest = 60.5 x (10%/12) x $4,215.45 = $2,124.76, which is less
than that collected ($2,318.45), thereby implying that the loan is usurious. The fallacy of this
reasoning is set forth in note 39 supra, and can be verified in either of two ways:
(1) A loan in the amount of $4,215.45 is fully amortizable in ten years with monthly
payments of $54.44 at an interest rate of 9.455%.
(2) A loan in the same amount at an interest rate of ten percent per annum (the maximum lawful rate) could be amortized in ten years with payments $55.71. Since each payment
in Grymes ($54.44) was less than $55.71, the loan would be at an interest rate of less than
ten percent.
121. See Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 787 (Tex. 1977). The calculations
would be as follows:
Stated Principal
True Principal
Maximum Permitted Interest
Total Permitted Repayment
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Example 8. D desires to purchase from L the same land valued at
$100. This time, however, L is unwilling to finance the purchase, so
D obtains a $100 loan from B bearing interest at the rate of eight
percent due in three years with three years interest paid in advance.

This loan would be held to be usurious since the front-end interest
would be deducted to arrive at the true principal. 2 '
In both instances D receives the same property and pays exactly
the same consideration. Viewed from D's position the two transactions are indistinguishable, yet under Tanner one form of the loan

is non-usurious while under Nevels and Miller the other form is
usurious. The apparent distinction drawn by Tanner is that the

lender in that case was also the seller of the land. It is the contention
of this author that who the lender is should be irrelevant, since
usury should be determined by the effect of the transaction on the

borrower.
The following example again illustrates the logical inconsistencies
in existing case law prior to the applicability of article 1.07(a).
Actual Repayment of Principal

-

Actual Payment of Interest

-

Total Actual Repayment

=

$100.00
24.00
$124.00

Since the Total Actual Repayment was less than the Total Permitted Repayment, the loan
would not be deemed usurious.
122. See First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. 1978). The calculations
would be as follows:
Stated Principal
Front-End Charge (8% x

-

$100.00 x 3)

True Principal
Maximum Permitted Interest ($76.00 x
Total Permitted Repayment
Actual Repayment of Principal
Actual Payment of Interest
Total Actual Repayment

=
-

10% x 3)

=
-

$100.00
24.00
76.00
22.80
$ 98.80

-

$100.00
24.00

-

$124.00

-

Since the Total Actual Repayment charged under the terms of the loan exceeds the Total
Permitted Repayment, the loan would be deemed usurious. This calculation under Miller but
not the result in this example is in conflict with Nevels since under Nevels the three years
interest would not be "double dipped" by adding it as interest after deducting it from principal. Since the Actual Repayment of Principal calculated above exceeded the Total Permitted
Repayment, the loan would also be usurious under Nevels. It is possible that a court could
at some future date distinguish Example 8 from Miller by expanding the holding of Tanner
Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977), to treat third party purchase money lenders
in the same manner as sellers who provide financing to prospective purchasers.
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Example 9. D executes a promissory note in the original principal
amount of $50,000 and bearing interest on the outstanding unpaid
principal, payable annually at the rate of ten percent per annum
during the first nine years of the loan and at the rate of 5.64% during
the tenth year. Interest is to be paid annually. Additionally, principal
payments in the amounts of $1,375.00, $1,512.50, $1,663.75, and
$1,830.12 are to be made at the end of the first, second, third, and
fourth years, respectively. Finally, additional principal advances to
D in the amounts of $1,111.86, $1,223.05, $1,345.35, $1,479.89, and
$1,627.88 are to be made by L at the end of the fifth, sixth, seventh,
eighth, and ninth years, respectively. All remaining unpaid principal
and accrued interest is due and payable at the end of the tenth year. 123
Under Texas law this loan would not be usurious, since interest
never exceeds ten percent in any year. This example is merely a
recharacterization of Example 24, infra, which was held to be usurious." 4
From the foregoing examples it should be obvious that under
existing law prior to the applicability of article 1.07(a) the form in
which a transaction is cast may very likely determine whether a
transaction is deemed usurious. Logic dictates that if the cost of a
loan to a borrower remains the same, the determination whether the
loan is or is not usurious should not vary simply because of the
labels placed upon the transaction by the parties. After a consideration of the constitutional aspects of article 1.07(a) and methods
other than the actuarial method, section VI of this article will discuss the actuarial method, a procedure for the calculation of interest
123. The loan can be summarized as follows:

Year

Beginning
Principal

Accrued
Interest

Principal
Payment

1
2

$50,000.00
48,625.00

$5,000.00
4,862.50

$1,375.00
1,512.50

3

47,112.50

4,711.25

1,663.75

4
5
6
7

45,448.75
43,618.63
44,730.49
45,953.54

4,544.88
4,361.86
4,473.05
4,595.35

1,830.12
-

8
9

47,298.89
48,778.78

4,729.89
4,877.88

-

10

50,406.66

2,843.34

Principal
Advance

Year End
Resulting
Principal

-

$48,625.00
47,112.50

-

45,448.75

$

1,111.86
1,223.05
1,345.35",

43,618.63
44,730.49
45,953.54
47,298.89

-

1,479.89
1,627.88

48,778.78
50,406.66

50,406.66

-

-

0.00

124. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 533 (1940).
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that reflects the economic reality of the transaction, thereby producing consistent results in the determination of usury.
IV.

A CONSTTrTIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF ARTICLE 1.07(a)

Any acceptable interpretation of article 1.07(a)'2 must be one
that renders the statute constitutional. The authority of the legislature for the enactment of any usury legislation including article
1.07(a) is controlled by the following language in the Texas Constitution:
The Legislature shall have authority to classify loans and lenders,
license and regulate lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates
of interest; provided, however, in the absence of legislation fixing
maximum rates of interest all contracts for a greater rate of interest
than ten per centum (10%) per annum shall be deemed usurious
In 1963, in apparent reliance on the above constitutional provision, the Texas Legislature enacted the Texas Savings and Loan
Act. 12 Section 5.07 of the statute provided:
[Aissociations may charge premiums for making such loans ....
The expenses, fees, and charges authorized herein shall be in addition
to interest authorized by law, and shall not be deemed to be a part
of the interest collected or agreed to be paid on such loans within the
meaning of any law of this State which limits the rate of interest
which may be exacted in any transaction.'28
In the recent decision of Gonzales County Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Freeman,2n a portion of this statute was held invalid because of its
failure to fix a maximum rate of interest while allowing a class of
lenders to charge potentially unlimited interest. The borrower in
Freeman had executed a $38,400 promissory note due one year from
the date of execution and bearing interest at the rate of nine percent
per annum. In addition, however, the borrower was charged a "loan
fee" of two percent of the loan amount ($768) at the time of the
closing of the loan.'"' The borrower subsequently defaulted on the
125. See text accompanying note 32 supra, for the text of article 1.07(a).
126. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 (emphasis added).
127. 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, § 1, at 269 (codified as Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 852a (Vernon 1964)).
128. Trx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.07 (Vernon 1964).
129. 534 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1976).
130. Id. at 905.
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first semi-annual interest payment and filed suit alleging that the
two percent "loan fee" constituted interest, thereby causing the
interest charged on the loan to exceed ten percent per annum.' 3 ' The
lender on the other hand contended that the "loan fee" constituted
a "premium" authorized under section 5.07. 13 The court, after stating that the courts must look "beyond the form of the transaction
to its substance in determining the existence or nonexistence of
usury,' ' 33 held that section 5.07 "does not purport to define interest
and cannot be regarded as an attempt by the Legislature to fix
maximum rates of interest.''3 Rather the legislature had attempted
to exclude from the court's consideration charges that would otherwise be construed as interest'3 5 under article 5069-1.01 (a). 13 For this
reason the Texas Supreme Court held unconstitutional the portion
of section 5.07 that allowed savings and loan associations to avoid
the application of the usury -laws through the mere characterization
of front-end fees as "premiums" that would in the absence of the
statute be deemed by a court to constitute interest."'
Similarly in State v. Community Finance & Thrift Corp., 3 ' the
Austin Court of Civil Appeals held unconstitutional 3 article 1524a131. Id. at 905.
132. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.07 (Vernon 1964).
133. Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. 1976).
134. Id. at 908.
135. Id. at 907.
136. TEx. REv. Ctr. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1971). "Interest" is defined as
"the compensation allowed by law for the use or forbearance or detention of money .
Id.
137. Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1976).
Under the logic of Gonzales, it is probable that article 5069-1.09, which allows certain federally insured loans to bear interest or to be discounted as permitted under certain federal
statutes, will ultimately be held to be unconstitutional. The statute fails to place any definite
limitation on the maximum interest rate other than that which is allowed under the various
federal programs, thereby sanctioning a constitutionally impermissible delegation of the re4uirement of the legislature to fix a maximum rate of interest. See Tax. Rav. CiV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5069-1.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979); cf. id. art. 5069-1.08. Article 5069-1.08 permits
interest charges not exceeding one and one-half percent per month by a broker or dealer
registered under the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Since the one and onehalf percent per month limit constitutes an effective ceiling on the maximum interest rate
permitted, the statute should pass constitutional muster. See also H.B. 409, discussed at
note 6 supra, providing that if the alternative floating rate of interest provided is held unconstitutional, the provision will be stated toread that interest "may be charged at the rate of
12% per annum." See 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 715, § 3, at 1766 (Vernon).
138. 334 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 161 Tex.
619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961).
139. Id. at 568.
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1.'" Under this complicated statutory scheme a lender could require, as a condition to obtaining the loan, that the borrower purchase an "investment certificate" from the lender, pledge that certificate as security for the loan and make periodic payments on the
certificate during the term of the loan. The court held those periodic
payments to be payments on the notes for purposes of usury determination. 4 ' Although the constitution at that time did not allow the
legislature to fix a maximum rate of interest greater than ten percent,' the constitution was so amended"' while this case was on
appeal to the supreme court. The Texas Supreme Court rejected the
argument that under the new amendment the statutory scheme was
constitutional, stating that the statute did "not purport to define
interest and in our opinion cannot be regarded as an attempt by the
Legislature to fix maximum rates of interest." '' Particularly instructive is the following language from the court's decision:
Petitioners' argument assumes that without establishing any ceiling
on interest the Legislature may legalize a subterfuge which enables
lenders to charge varying rates in excess of ten percent per annum,
but this is not so. The constitutional amendment provides that in the
absence of legislation fixing maximum rates of interest all contracts
for a greater rate than ten percent per annum shall be deemed usurious.'
Any interpretation of article 1.07(a) that allows a lender, through a
140. 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 472, §§ 1-6, at 832-34 (repealed 1963).
141. State v. Community Fin. & Thrift Corp., 334 S.W.2d 559, 568 (Tex. Civ.
App,-Austin 1960), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 161 Tex. 619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961).
142. See Tx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 (1891). Prior to the amendment of this provision in
1960, section 11 provided:
All contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per centum per annum, shall be
deemed usurious, and the first Legislature after this amendment is adopted, shall
provide appropriate pains and penalties to prevent the same; but when no rate of
interest is agreed upon, the rate shall not exceed six per centum per annum.
Id.
143. TEx. CoNSr. art. XVI, § 11. The italicized language was added:
The Legislatureshall have authority to classify loans and lenders, license and regulate
lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates of interest; provided, however, in the
absence of legislationfixing maximum rates of interest all contracts for a greater rate
of interest than ten per centum (10%) per annum shall be deemed usurious; provided,
further, that in contracts where no rate of interest is agreed upon, the rate shall not
exceed six per centum (6%) per annum.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. Community Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. State, 161 Tex. 619, 621, 343 S.W.2d 232, 233
(1961).
145. Id. at 622, 343 S.W.2d at 234.
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camouflage of the true transaction, to charge interest in excess of
ten percent per annum should be rejected since that interpretation
would render the statute unconstitutional.
The portion of article 1.07(a) concerning spreading that requires
interpretation for a determination of the constitutionality' of the
statute is as follows:
Determination of the rate of interest for the purpose of determining
whether the loan is usurious . . . shall be made by amortizing, prorating, allocating, and spreading, in equal parts during the period of
the full stated term of the loan, all interest at any time contracted
for, charged, or received from the borrower in connection with the
loan. "'

Because the statute fails to define the meaning of the phrase
"amortizing, prorating, allocating, and spreading, in equal parts
during the period of the full stated term of the loan, all interest,"
various interpretations of this language produce decidedly different
results.' Unfortunately some of these terms are inconsistent with
146. While the determination of the constitutionality of article 1.07(a) is a threshhold
issue, the statute presents several other unresolved problems in interpretation [See text
accompanying note 32 supra, for the text of article 1.07(a)]:
(i) The types of loans to which the statute may apply appear to be many since the
article purports to cover loans secured or to be secured by a "lien, mortgage, security interest,
or other interest in or with respect to any interest in real property." Arguably, the article
would be applicable to a loan secured by a partnership interest in a real estate syndication
or a loan secured by the pledge of a promissory note that itself is secured by a lien on real
property.
(ii) The statute's restriction to real estate transactions leaves unclear whether the statute preempts the application of the judicially developed concept of spreading to transactions
not involving real estate or whether it merely represents a codification of spreading in this
one particular area.
(iii) The mandatory refund provision of the statute appears to apply only upon full
voluntary prepayment by the borrower. The manner of application of the statute remains
unclear in the event of the acceleration of the maturity of the loan by the lender upon default
by the borrower.
(iv) The new statute provides for prospective application on and after its effective date.
Since usury is judged at the inception of the loan, the new statute may be inapplicable to a
usurious loan consummated prior to September 1, 1975, even though renewed subsequent to
that date. See Cherry v. Berg, 508 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no
writ).
(v) A loan commitment may constitute the inception of a loan within the language of
the article referring to "contracting for" interest.
(vi) The statute is unclear whether loans payable "on demand," or payable on a date
certain "unless demand is sooner made," fall within the statute and, if so, how they would
be treated.
147. Tax. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
148. See sections V and VI infra.
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one another, thus causing ambiguity in the interpretation of the
statute.'
The question of multiple interpretations of the statute, however,
can largely be resolved by an elimination of those methods that
allow a lender to circumvent the usury laws through a disguised
form of the transaction. These methods as well as the actuarial
method are disussed in the following sections of this article. It is the
contention of the author that of these possible methods only the
actuarial method prevents the possibility of evasion of the usury
laws.
V.

METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE

1.07(a)

OTHER THAN THE

ACTUARIAL METHOD

To date five interpretations of article 1.07(a) embodying varying
methods of interest calculation have been suggested. Four of these
methods will be discussed in this section, and will be referred to as
(i) the Averaging of Interest Rates Technique, (ii) the Averaging of
Interest Amounts Technique, (iii) the Hypothetical Amortization
Technique, and (iv) the Total Interest Declining Balance Technique. The fifth, the Actuarial Method, will be discussed in section
VI of this article since it embodies a basic concept of financial
analysis that is ignored by the first four methods. This basic concept
is that the "present value"' 5 " of a payment depends upon the time
the payment is made. Each of the first four methods ignores to some
extent the actual timing of the payments in a loan transaction. 5 '
Since the method of spreading adopted by the Texas Supreme Court
in Nevels"5 I for characterizing front-end fees is a special case of the
application of this present value concept, 5 3 the adoption of any of
the first four interpretations, which are based on a different concept,
149. The term "amortize" is used typically in connection with the amortization of a loan,
which entails a gradual reduction of the unpaid principal, usually by equal monthly payments
that are composed of a portion of the principal and of the unpaid accrued interest. Over the
term of the loan the principal portion of each payment increases, reflecting the decreasing
amount of interest accrued on the unpaid principal balance since the last payment. If the
additional terms "allocate . . . in equal parts" are construed to mean equal amounts of
interest, this would conflict with the concept of amortization that assumes a uniform rate of
interest over the term of the loan. Similar problems are presented by the term "prorate."
150. See text accompanying note 191 infra.
151. See text following note 152 infra.
152. Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937),
153. See text accompanying note 191 infra.
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requires the rejection of the Nevels approach."' Each of these four
methods will now be discussed in detail.
A. Averaging of Interest Rates Technique (the "Rates Technique")
One literal interpretation of article 1.07(a), advocated by at least
one Texas attorney who frequently represents lenders, averages the
interest rates over the life of the loan by totaling the interest rates
(including front-end "points") over the term of the loan and dividing this sum by the number of years of the loan. Example 10 illustrates this technique as applied to an amortized loan:
Example 10. L loans $50,000 to D to be amortized over thirty years
in equal monthly installments of principal and interest, interest
accruing at the rate of nine percent per annum. As a condition of
making the loan L requires D to pay thirty points at the commencement of the loan.
The calculations for this loan under the Rates Method would be as
follows:
Years
1
2-30

Interest Calculation
9% + 30%
9% x 29

Total Interest
39%
261%
300%

Average Rate

Total Interest
Total number of years

-

300%
30 years

=

10%o per annum

Thus under this method a lender could extract thirty points at
the front-end of the loan and still not render the loan usurious,
although, under existing cast law the loan would clearly be
usurious.' 51 The required monthly payments for a $50,000 loan
154. For example, in the paper presented by Small and Lasiter in November 1978, to
the Texas Savings and Loan League entitled Mortgage Interest Rates, Loan Originationand
Refund Calculations,the authors argue for a distinction between the "judicial test" of Nevels
and the "statutory test" of article 1.07(a). For a further explanation, see a memorandum in
support of S.B. 246, which would amend article 1.07(a), entitled "The Case for a Uniform
Method of Testing Real Estate Credit Transactions for Usury and a Limit on the Amount of
Front-End Loan as Provided by Senate Bill 246." dated February 2, 1979. Senate Bill 246 is
discussed at note 182 infra.
155. See Eubanks v. Simpson, 90 S.W.2d 291, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ
ref'd) ($70 front-end fee deducted from principal in determining interest rate on a $1,500 loan
payable in 120 monthly installments of $18.75).
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amortized over a thirty-year period at nine percent is $402.31.111
Previous judicial decisions indicate that a court would deem the
actual principal advanced in Example 10 to be only $35,000.111
Montly payments of $402.31 per month on this reduced principal
amortized over thirty years yields an interest rate of 13.55%.151
156. This amount can be obtained from amortization tables or derived from actuarial
concepts as follows:
i
n
v"

an

----9 = .0075
12
= 30x12 = 360
1
_
1
= .067886
(1.0075)360
(1 + )"
n
.932114
-- l-v
.1
- 124.281867
.0075

1

PV

PMT

5.n

_

50,000
124.281867

402.31

Combining the above,
PMT = PVx1

_- (1 + i)-"

Where,
i

=

the monthly nominal interest rate (.09/12)

V
= the discount factor
a,
an annuity-immediate
PMT
the monthly debt service
PV
= the principal amount of the loan
n

= the number of payments

157. See Eubanks v. Simpson, 90 S.W.2d 291, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ
ref'd). $50,000 - (30% X $50,000) = $35,000.

158. This interest rate may be determined from an amortization table or by reiteration
of the following equation selecting successively closer values of i at each iteration:
1-

i
(+i)-

PMT
PV
402.31
35,000.00
- .0114945714

where PMT
PV
i

=
=

the amount of the monthly payment
the true amount advanced
the monthly interest rate

n

=

the number of months of the loan

and

Thus it then becomes necessary to solve the equation through trial and error or reiterative
approximations (or with the aid of a computer or programmable calculator) to find a value i
that satisfies the equation,
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The following example demonstrates the structuring of a nonamortized loan that would give an unscrupulous lender an unlimited
yield under the Rates Method:
Example 11. L loans $50,000 to D, interest payable annually at the
rate of five percent per annum ($2,500) for twenty years at which time
the original principal amount is to be repaid. As a condition of making the loan L requires D to pay ninety-five points at the beginning
of the loan.
The calculations for Example 11 under the Rates Technique would
be as follows:
Years
1
2-20

Interest Calculation
95% + 5%
5% X 19

Total Interest
100%
95%
195%

Average Rate =

195%1
20 years

=

9.75% per annum

In this example under the analysis of Nevels'59 the borrower would
receive a true principal of $2,500, 11pay $2,500 interest each year for
twenty years and at the end of the twentieth year pay back the
original $50,000 of stated principal. Since the borrower is paying
$2,500 interest each year; he is in effect paying 100% interest per
annum of the amount actually advanced. Additionally at the end
of the twentieth year he must pay $52,500,61 which results in an
interest rate of 2000%111 of the amount actually advanced during the
i

1-

(

+ i)-

3 °

.0114945714

In. this example the approximate value of i that satisfies this equation is
.011293, which is the monthly rate of interest. The nominal annual rate of
interest is, therefore, 12 x .011293 = 13.5516%
159. See Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 196, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 1049 (1937).
160. See id. at 196, 102 S.W.2d at 1049. $50,000 - (95% X $50,000) = $2,500.
161. Under the terms of the loan the original stated principal ($50,000) plus one year's
interest on that amount at five percent ($2,500) must be repaid. When viewed as a repayment
of the true principal of $2,500, the remaining $50,000 must therefore be considered interest.
162.
$50,000 = 2,000 percent.
2,500
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last year of the loan.'
B. Averaging of Interest Amounts Technique (the "Amounts
Technique")
A method that yields the same result for an unamortized loan as
the Rates Technique is one which will be referred to as the Amounts
Technique. Under this method the total amount of interest contracted for over the full term of the loan (including any front-end
charges) is calculated and then divided by the original stated principal amount.
Example 11 would be computed as follows:
Front-end Charges (95% x $50,000.00)
Total Interest (20 X 5% X $50,000.00
Total Interest Including Front-End
Term of the Loan

$47,500.00
50,000.00

-

-

-

Average Annual Interest
Stated Loan Amount

97,500.00
20 years

$ 4,875.00
"- $50,000.00

-

--

Average Interest Rate

9.75%

Thus for an unamortized loan, the result is the same under the
Amounts Technique as under the Rates Technique. This result follows because -in an unamortized loan (i.e., a loan in which the
monthly payments cover only the interest due), the unpaid principal remains constant, and the ratio between the average amount of
interest paid in a year and the principal amount is equal to the
average interest rate.
Strict application of the Amounts Technique to an amortized loan
produces an even greater understatement of the yield of the loan
(i.e., the interest rate) than the Rates Technique as is shown by
163. Under Nevels, the computation would be as follows:

True Principal
Maximum Permitted Interest
(20 x 10% x $2,500.00)

$
-

2,500.00
500.00

Maximum Permitted Repayment
Stated Principal
Total Actual Interest Paid

=

Total Actual Repayment

= $100,000.00

-

$ 3,000.00
$ 50,000.00
$ 50,000.00

Therefore, the loan would be usurious since the Total Actual Repayment is greatly in excess
of the Maximum Permitted Repayment.
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application of the Amounts Technique to the loan described in Example 10:
Front-End Charges (30%

x $50,000.00)

$15,000.00

-

Total Interest over the life of loan1 64

-

$104,648.80

Total Interest

119,648.80

Term of Loan

Average Interest
Amount of Loan
Average Rate

30 years

+

-

$

-

-

-

3,988.29
50,000.00
7.97658%

The reason for this increased distortion of the effective rate of interest is that the Amounts Technique fails to take into account that
the entire principal is not outstanding during the full term of the
loan, but rather bases its determination of an interest rate on the
assumption that the borrower has had the use of the entire principal
over the full term of the loan. It is possible, however, to modify the
Amounts Technique for amortized loans to yield a result that is
compatible with the Rates Technique. Under this modification,
which will be referred to as the "Modified Amounts Technique," the
outstanding unpaid principal balance during each period of the loan
is added and then this sum is divided by the number of periods in
the term of the loan. This average unpaid principal is then used in
the calculations instead of the full stated amount of principal. In
actuality this Modified Amounts Technique is merely a complicated
method of arriving at a result identical to that yielded by the Rates
Technique.8 5
164. This can be calculated either by adding up the interest portion of each payment
from an amortization schedule or calculated by the following equation:
TI =

(n x PMT) -

PV

Where TI
n

=
=

total interest
number of monthly payments

PMT

=

amount of monthly payments

PV
Thus, TI

amount of loan
(360 x 429.58) -

50,000-00

.$104,648.80

165. The average unpaid principal is derived from the actual unpaid principal balances
upon which interest is computed. Thus interest in the average principal balance concept is
the actual interest rate.
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Fluctuating or differing interest rates produce similar examples.
Unfortunately, since each of the above methods ignores basic principles of finance in failing to consider the timing of the payments,",
it is possible to structure an unlimited return-on-capital ("yield")
to the lender and an unlimited effective interest rate to the borrower. This is demonstrated by the following Table A, which indicates the maximum permissible front-end charges for selfamortizing loans of various periods and interest rates when calculated under either the Rates Technique or the Modified Amounts
Technique: 7
TABLE A
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE
FRONT-END CHARGES UNDER RATES
TECHNIQUE AND MODIFIED AMOUNTS TECHNIQUE
(Percent of Loan Amount)
Interest
Rate (%-)
9.999
9.990
9.900
9.750
9.500
9.250
9.000
8.000
7.000
6.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000
.100
.010
.001

1

5

10

.001
.010
.100
.250
.500
.750
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
7.000
8.000
9.000
9.900
9.990
9.999

.005
.050
.500
1.250
2.500
3.750
5.000
10.000
15.000
20.000
25.000
30.000
35.000
40.000
45.000
49.500
49.950
49.995

.010
.100
1.000
2.500
5.000
7.500
10.000
20.000
30.000
40.000
50.000
60.000
70.000
80.000
90.000
99.000
99.900
99.990

YEARS
20
.020
.200
2.000
5.000
10.000
15.000
20.000
40.000
60.000
80.000
100.000
120.000
140.000
160.000
180.000
198.000
199.800
199.980

30

50

100

.030
.300
3.000
7.500
15.000
22.500
30.000
60.000
90.000
120.000
150.000
180.000
210.000
240.000
270.000
297.000
299.700
299.970

.050
.500
5.000
12.500
25.000
37.500
50.000
100.000
150.000
200.000
250.000
300.000
350.000
400.000
450.000
495.000
499.500
499.950

.100
1.000
10.000
25.000
50.000
75.000
100.000
200.000
300.000
400.000
500.000
600.000
700.000
800.000
900.000
990.000
999.000
999.900

The remaining two methods are concerned with application of
article 1.07(a) to amortized loans.
166. See text accompanying note 191 infra.
167. The maximum permissible front-end charges are even greater if the Amounts Technique is used.
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C. The Hypothetical Amortization Technique (the "Amortization
Technique")
One interpretation of the application of article
1.07(a) to amortized loans involves the construction of a hypothetical or artificial
amortization schedule different from that chosen by the parties to
the transaction. In any amortized loan four factors are involved: (1)
the amount of the loan, (2) the interest rate of the loan, (3) the term
of the loan required to self-amortize the loan, and (4) the amount
of the monthly payment. Selection of the interest rate, and any two
of the remaining three factors is sufficient to define an amortization
schedule and to allow the calculation of the fourth factor.' 8 It is
also a simple matter to compute the total interest that is to be paid
under any given amortization schedule as a function of the amount
of the loan, the monthly payment, and the term of the loan.' 9
It is therefore possible to construct a hypothetical amortization
schedule from any proposed loan substituting an interest rate of ten
percent (the usury limit) for that stated in the loan. From this
hypothetical amortization schedule it is then possible to calculate
the total interest that would be payable over its term.'70 This hypothetical schedule would be the maximum amount that could be
collected on a self-amortizing loan of a given amount and term.
Under the Amortization Technique the difference between the total
permissible interest under the hypothetical amortization schedule
and the total interest under the actual amortization schedule is
advocated to be the available interest or front-end charge that could
be charged to the borrower.
168.
If

PV
n
PMT
i

Then PV

amount of the loan
number of payment periods
payment per period
interest rate per period

=
=
=
=

the
the
the
the

=

PMT x

i

PMTPIn =PV x

-

(

+

0

- n

+ i)-"
ixPV

--

fn[ 1

PMT)

In (1 + i)
169. See note 164 supra.
170. See note 164 supra.
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The rules for application of this method can be summarized as
follows:
(1) The total interest to be collected over the life of the loan is
calculated (the "Total Interest").
(2) The total interest to be collected over the life of a self-amortizing
loan in the same original principal amount bearing an interest rate
of ten percent is then calculated (the "Maximum Interest").
(3) The Total Interest is then subtracted from the Maximum Interest to arrive at the amount of a maximum front-end charge (the
"Front-End Charge"). Any front-end charge exceeding this amount
would render the loan usurious. The front-end charge can be divided
by the original stated loan amount to arrive at the maximum number
of front-end points chargeable. Thus, if this number of "points" is
exceeded, the loan would be usurious.
An example may help clarify this novel method:
Example 12. L loans $50,000 to D to be amortized over thirty years
in equal monthly installments of principal and interest, interest
accruing at the rate of 9.75% per annum on the unpaid principal
balance.
The amount of each installment would be $429.58.111 Total interest over the life of the loan would be $104,648.80 (the "Total interest").'72 The total amount of interest for a loan of $50,000 amortized
over a thirty-year period at ten percent per annum would be
73
$107,964.40 (the "Maximum Interest").
171. Using the formula for PMT set forth at note 156 supra:
, .0975 /12

i

.008125

-

$50,000.00 x 1.008125

PMT

(1.008125)

1-

-

360

$429.58

172. Using the formula for TI set forth at note 164 supra:
TI

-=

(360 x 429.58) -

$50,000.00

$104,648.80
173.
i

PMT

=

.01/12 = .0008333

=

$50,000.00

=
TI

=

=

x

.0008333
1-

$438.79
(360 x 438.79) $107,964.40

(1.0008333)-360
$50,000.00

See notes 164 and 168 supra.
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Maximum Interest
Total Interest

$107,964.40
104,648.80

-

3,315.60
- 50,000.00

Front-End Charge
Loan Amount

6.6312 4,

Maximum Permitted Points
existing case law,'74 however,

a front-end charge of even five
Under
points would be usurious under the following analysis. The required
monthly payments for a $50,000 loan amortized over a thirty-year
period at 9.75% is $429.58.' 71 The actual principal advanced is only
$47,500.' 71 Monthly payments of $429.58 on this reduced principal
amortized over a thirty-year period yield an interest rate of 10.30%'1
Despite the ingenuity of this approach, the same basic failing is
present in this technique as those previously described-failure to
consider the timing of the front-end charge-as is demonstrated by
the following example.
Example 13. L loans $50,000 to D at the stated rate of six percent per
annum on the unpaid principal balance to be amortized over thirty
years in equal monthly installments of principal and interest. What
is the maximum front-end charge permissible under the Amortization Method?
The calculation would be as follows:
Maximum Interest
Total Interest 178

-

$107,964.40
57,920.80
$ 50,043.60
_ 50,000.00

Front-End Charge
Loan Amount

100.0872%

Maximum Permitted Points

Thus at a six percent interest rate this method would allow the
lender to collect at the time of the "loan" of $50,000 a front-end
174.
ref'd).
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Eubanks v. Simpson, 90 S.W.2d 291, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ
For the method of calculation, see note 171 supra.
$50,000.00 - (5% X $50,000) = $47,500.
This can be verified by resort to amortization schedules.
PMT

=

$50,000.00

TI

=

(360 x $299.78)

x

1

-

-

.005
(1.005) 26

0

=

$299.78

$50,000.00 .. $57,920.80

See notes 164 and 168 supra.
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charge of $50,043.60. Further, the borrower would be required to
make payments of $299.787 per month for thirty years. Thus, use
of this method of calculation for the purposes of article 1.07(a)
would allow the possibility of unlimited interest rates and would
therefore render the statute unconstitutional."" The maximum permitted front-end charges that would be permitted under this
method are summarized below in Table B.
TABLE B
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE FRONT-END
CHARGES UNDER AMORTIZATION
TECHNIQUE
(Percent of Loan Amount)
Interest
Rate (%)

9.999
9.990
9.900
9.750
9.250
9.000
8.000
7.000
6.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000
.100
.010
.001

1

5

10

Years
20

30

50

100

.001
.006
.056
.139

.003
.030
.295
.737
2.203
2.932
5.824
8.675
11.485
14.255
16.983
19.670
22.316
24.920
27.229
27.463
27.526

.007
.066
.664
1.657
4.942
6.570
12.988
19.251
25.356
31.302
37.087
42.708
48.165
53.456
58.077
58.537
58.622

.016
.159
1.588
3.961
11.797
15.671
30.860
45.533
59.662
73.216
86.170
98.502
110.193
121.231
1.30.598
131.511
131.642

.027
.266
2.657
6.630
19.763
26.262
51.771
76.417
100.088
122.670
144.056
164.148
182.863
200.136
214.415
215.781
215.957

.049
.486
4.859
12.137
36.301
48.322
95.899
142.450
187.620
230.980
272.039
310.277
345.189
376.348
400.939
403.219
403.485

.100
1.000
9.996
24.988
74.955
99.932
199.772
299.395
398.534
496.620
592.534
684.267
768.683
841.811
894.961
899.552
900.004

.418
.557
1.113
1.667
2.219
2.770
3.319
3.867
4.412
4.957
5.446
5.500
5.546

D. The Total Interest Declining Balance Technique (the
"Declining Balance Technique")
This method, recently presented at a meeting of the Texas Savings and Loan League,'"' and a form of which is being introduced
as a proposed amendment to article 1.07(a),'11 carries the sophistica179. See note 178 supra.
180. See Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex.
1976).
181. The Texas Savings and Loan League is a trade association of savings and loan
associations located in Texas.
182. On January 23, 1979, Senate Bill No. 246 was submitted to the Economic Develop-
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ment Committee of the Senate, and was passed by the Senate on March 27, 1979, but failed
to come out of committee in the House. An identical bill, House Bill 615, introduced by
Representative McFarland was submitted to the Financial Institutions Committee of the
House and on February 27, 1979, was referred to a subcommittee. Section 1 of the Senate
Bill would have amended article 1.07(a) to read as follows:
(a) No loan or agreement or loan secured or to be secured, in whole or in part, by a
lien, mortgage, security interest, or other interest in or with respect to any interest in
real property, shall be considered usurious under the laws of this State if:
(i) the total amount of interest whenever paid and to be paid by the obligor
thereon does not exceed the sum of the amounts determined by applying the
maximum lawful rate of interest for such a loan to the full periodic balances due
under the schedule of payments provided in the loan contract assuming that all
periodic payments of principal and interest required by the loan contract are
timely made and
(ii) the aggregate interest paid by the obligor or retained out of the proceeds
of the loan by the lender at the time the loan was made did not exceed ten
percent (10%) of the full stated original principal amount of the obligation.
However, in the event the loan is either paid in full by the obligor or the obligation,
for any reason, becomes payable in full prior to the end of the full stated term of the
loan and the interest paid by the obligor to the date of such prepayment or early
maturity exceeds the sum of the amounts determined by applying the maximum
lawful rate of interest for such a loan to the full periodic principal balances due under
the loan contract to the date of prepayment or early maturity the holder of the obligation shall refund to the obligor the amount of the excess or shall credit the amount of
the excess against amounts owing under the loan contract and shall not be subject to
any of the penalties provided by law for contracting for, charging, or receiving interest
in excess of the maximum lawful rate.
Subsection (i) of the proposed amendment would have been a codification of the Declining
Balance Technique. Subsection (ii) is obviously an attempted response to the criticism that
the Declining Balance Technique by itself places no ceiling on what front-end fee can be
extracted from the borrower through creative structuring the transaction by the lender. See
text accompanying note 187 infra. Unfortunately the proposed amendment, if constitutional,
would have permitted evasion of the usury laws as can be shown by the following examples:
Example A. L loans $50,000 to D to be payable as follows: (i) ten front-end points
($5,000) at the time loan is made, (ii) 99.5% interest ($49,750) payable at the end of
the first year, (iii) no interest during years 2 through 11, and (iv) repayment of principal at the end of the eleventh year.
Again, since no more than ten front-end points were charged at the time of the making of
the loan, the loan complies with the requirements of subsection (ii). Application of the test
set forth in subsection (i) would yield the following:
Front-End Charge
Interest Year 1
Interest Years 2-11
Total Interest Paid
Permitted Interest

-

-

$ 5,000.00
49,750.00
0.00
$54,750.00

$50,000.00 x 10% x 11 = $55,000.00

In reality D received only $45,000 at closing and at the end of the first year repaid $49,750.
At the maximum lawful rate, a $45,000 loan would permit the lender to collect $4,500 interest
at the end of the first year. Subtracting this from $49,750 yields $45,250 of which only $45,000
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can be attributable to repayment of principal. Thus L has been repaid the full amount
advanced to D, received repayment of this amount plus interest in excess of ten percent at
the end of the first year of the loan and is still entitled to receive a $50,000 payment at the
end of the eleventh year even though he has been repaid in full with interest in excess of ten
percent of the amount actually advanced at the end of the first year. Thus the lender's yield
is at all times during this loan in excess of ten percent, and is actually a 23.749% yield over
the entire loan term.
Example B. L loans to D $50,000 to be payable as follows (i) ten "points" payable at
the time the loan is made, (ii) 100% interest ($50,000) payable at the end of the first,
second, and third years, (iii) ninety percent interest ($45,000) payable at the end of
the fourth year and (iv) no interest thereafter until the end of the fortieth year at which
time the full stated principal amount would be due.
This example complies with the requirement of subsection (ii) that no more than ten "frontend" points be collected at the time of the making of the loan. Furthermore, since this loan
is an interest-only loan, the application of subsection (i) would permit the collection of ten
percent per annum ($5,000) on the full principal each year thus yielding a total permissible
interest charge of $200,000 over the life of the loan. The interest actually collected is computed as follows:
Front-End points
Interest Year 1
Interest Year 2

-

$ 5,000.00
50,000.00
50,000.00

Interest Year 3

--

50,000.00

Interest Year 4
Interest Year 5-40

=

45,000.00
0.00

Total Actual Interest

=

$200,000.00

-

Thus, since the Total Actual Interest is equal to the maximum permitted by subsection (i),
the loan would presumably not be usurious. If, however, the yield to L or the cost to D is
examined, the true rate of interest is found to be 104.033% and therefore the loan should be
found to be usurious.
These extreme examples have been chosen for purposes of illustration. The important
point is that it is possible for a loan to be structured under this proposed amendment to evade
the usury laws.
If article 1.07(a) is to be amended in order to remove the possibility of construction of
the statute as unconstitutional, this author contends that the following amendment, which
is based upon a somewhat more detailed and elaborate version prepared by James H. Wallenstein in 1977, would be an appropriate amendment:
(a) Except as may be provided to the contrary in other Chapters of this Title, on any
loan or agreement to loan secured or to be secured, in whole or in part, by a lien,
mortgage, security interest, or other interest in or with respect to any interest in real
property, calculation of the rate of interest for the purpose of determining whether the
loan is usurious under all applicable Texas laws shall be made by amortizing in accordance with the "actuarial method" (as defined in this section) all payments of principal
or interest at any time contracted for, charged, or received in connection with the loan.
If the interest rate on a loan, which is not usurious under its express provisions when
calculated pursuant to the "actuarial method", exceeds the maximum lawful rate
because the loan either is paid in full or is matured prior to the end of the full stated
term of the loan, or in the case of a demand obligation because demand is made by
the lender, and at a time when the interest contracted for, charged or received to the
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tion of the Amortization Technnique even one step further. Under
this method:'3
(1) The total interest that would be collected over the life of the loan
is calculated (the "Total Interest")."
(2) An amortization schedule of the loan is computed at the given
interest rate and for the stated term. The amount of principal that,
according to the schedule would remain unpaid at the beginning of
each month, is multiplied by the monthly equivalent of the maximum lawful interest ratelu to find the maximum interest chargeable
in each month. The result of all of the multiplications are then added
to arrive at the maximum permissible interest (the "Maximum Interest") that can be collected under this method.
(3) The Total Interest is then subtracted from the Maximum Interest to arrive at a maximum front-end charge (the "Front-End
Charge").
(4) The Front-End Charge is then divided by the original stated
loan amount to arrive at the maximum number of front-end points
chargeable. As in the case of the Amortization Technique, if this
number of front-end points is exceeded the loan will be usurious.
The following example should clarify how this method is applied:
Example 14. L loans $500,000 to D to be amortized over one year in
twelve equal monthly installments of principal and interest, interest
accruing at the rate of six percent per annum. What is the maximum
number of permissible front-end points?
date of such payment, maturity, or demand exceeds the maximum lawful rate, the
lender contracting for, charging, or receiving all such interest shall not be subject to
any of the penalties provided by law for contracting for, charging, or receiving interest
in excess of the maximum lawful rate but shall be obligated either to refund to the
borrower the amount of the excess or to credit the amount of the excess against
amounts owing under the loan and shall not be subject to any of the penalties provided
by law for contracting for, charging, or receiving interest in excess of the maximum
lawful rate. The term "actuarial method" as used in this section, means the method
of allocating payments made on a debt between the principal balance and accrued
interest pursuant to which a payment (whether it is so characterized by the parties to
the transaction) is applied first to the entirety of the accrued interest and any remainder is subtracted from, or any deficiency is added to, the unpaid principal balance.
This amendment would remove many of the ambiguities of interpretation present in article
1.07(a) and would remove any doubt about its constitutionality.
183. The following analysis is based upon a paper presented in November 1978, at the
Texas Savings and Loan League by Clint Small, attorney-at-law, and David Lasiter, accounting doctoral candidate, and subsequent telephone conversations with Mr. Lasiter. The author
of this article wishes to thank Mr. Lasiter for the courtesy of explaining the mathematical
derivation of this method.
184. See note 164 supra for the formula.
185. Usually for ease of calculation, a nominal rate is used instead of an effective rate.
For a discussion of these concepts, see note 205 infra.
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The calculations would be as follows: 86
10% Interest

PMT

Beginning
Balance

Scheduled
Interest

Reduction
of
Principal

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

$500,000.00
459,466.79
418,730.91
377,791.35
336,647.10
295,297.13
253,740.41
211,975.90
170,002.57
127,819.37
85,825.26
42,819.18

$ 2,500.00
2,297.33
2,093.65
1,888.96
1,683.24
1,476.49
1,268.70
1,059.88
850.01
639.10
427.13
214.09

$ 40,533.21
40,735.88
40,939.56
41,444.25
41,349.97
41,556.72
41,764.51
41,973.33
42,183.20
42,394.11
42,606.08
42,818.12

Total Interest

$459,466.79
418,730.91
377,791.35
336,647.10
295,297.13
253,740.41
211,975.90
170,002.57
127,819.37
85,425.26
42,819.18
-0--

$16,398.52

Maximum Interest
Total Interest
Front-End Charge
Loan Amount
Maximum Permitted Points

on
Beginning
Balance

Resulting
Balance
$

4,166.65
3,828.87
3,489.41
3,148.25
2,805.38
2,460.80
2,114.49
1,766.46
1,416.68
1,065.16
711.87
356.83
$27,330.85

-

$ 27,330.85
16,389.52

-

10,932.33
$500,000.00
-

2.18646%
186. The calculations presented in the text are for purposes of demonstrating the concept
of the Declining Balance Technique. There is, however, a simpler method of calculating the
maximum front-end charge permissible under this method.
the average unpaid principal period
the total interest
i - the interest rate per period
n
the number of periods
PMT the payment per period
PV = the original loan amount
From note 164 supra,
TI = (nxPMT) - PV
Let

B
TI

=
=

And by definition the number of periods multiplied by the average balance
by the interest per period will also equal the total interest.
TI = (nxB) xi
Combining these two formulae yields
PMT - (PV/n)
B
i
In Example 14,
43,033.21- (500,000/12)
(.06/12)
$273,308.80
Now the total interest at ten percent on the balances computed directly:
(nixB) xi
TI
(12 x $273,308.80) x (.1/12)
= $27,330.88
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Unfortunately, the same flaw present in the Amortization Technique is also present in the Declining Balance Technique, as is
demonstrated by the following example:
Example 15. L loans $50,000 to D to be amortized over a thirty year
period in equal monthly installments of principal and interest, interest accruing at the rate of eight percent per annum. What is the
maximum number of permissible front-end points?
The calculations'

for this example are as follows:

Maximum Interest
Total Interest

$102,590.85
82,076.80

Front-End Charge
Loan Amount

-i+

Maximum Permitted Points

$ 20,514.05
50,000.00
41.0281%

The reduced principal of $29,477.00 if amortized over thirty years
in monthly payments of $366.88 per month would yield an interest
rate of 14.75% per anum, in which event the loan should be usurious. 8 8 Even more extreme examples of front-end charges permissible for various loans under this method are summarized under
Table C.
187.
i
PMT

=

.08/12

.00667
1
1- (1.+ i)

=

PV x

-

$50,000.00 x
- $36.88

-=

$366.88

-

.00667
1 -- (1.00667)360

(n x PMT) - PV
(360 x $366.88) - $50,000.00

TI
=

$82,076.80
(PV/i)
i

PMT -

B

366.88 -

(50,000.00/360)

.00667
$35,196.95

-

Maximum Interest (i
TI

=
=

.1/12)
(nxB) xi
(360 x $34,196.95) x (.1/12)
$102,590.85

188. See Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 907-08
(Tex. 1976).
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TABLE C
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE FRONT-END
CHARGES UNDER DECLINING BALANCE
TECHNIQUE
(Percent of Loan Amount)
Interest
Rate (%)
9.999
9.990
9.900
9.750
9.500
9.250
9.000
8.000
7.000
6.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000
.100
.010
.001

1
.003
.005
.054
.136
.271
.407
.542
1.082
1.621
2.158
2.693
3.227
3.760
4.290
4.820
5.363
5.412
5.418

10

5
.003
.027
.274
.685
1.368
2.048
2.726
5.411
8.055
10.658
13.220
15.740
18.218
20.655
23.050
25.183
25.395
25.426

.006
.059
.585
1.459
2.909
4.348
5.778
11.396
16.853
22.146
27.274
32.236
37.031
41.659
46.118
49.995
50.378
50.435

Years
20
.013
.132
1.313
3.273
6.511
9.713
12.881
25.185
36.886
47.960
58.386
68.150
77.238
85.649
93.373
99.744
100.356
100.457

30

50

.022
.216
2.154
5.367
10.669
15.904
21.074
41.040
59.789
77.224
93.254
107.800
120.816
132.249
142.109'
149.659
150.350
150.479

.040
.403
4.026
10.033
19.957
29.773
39.459
76.899
111.859
143.905
172.479
197.128
217.429
233.098
244.037
294.982
250.396
250.530

100
.090

.900
9.072
22.403
44.594
-66.917
88.414
174.693
257.155
334.407
403.524
461.379
503.499
525.489
524.151
503.679
500.755
500.660

Each of the four methods discussed allows the creation of a loan
that results in a potentially unlimited effective interest rate just as
the "premiums" under article 852a' provided the opportunity for
unlimited additional interest charges which were held unconstitutional in Gonzales."' For these reasons an alternative constitutional
method of calculation is necessary. The author is of the opinion
that the actuarial method discussed in the next section fulfills this
need.
VI.

THE ACTUARIAL METHOD

Analysis of the economic reality of a loan transaction provides one
fundamental tool for usury determination. One further concept,
missing from the methods discussed in section V, must be introduced into any usury analysis in order to meaningfully calculate a
rate of interest in a given transaction. This concept is that the value
189. TEx. REv. Civ.

STAT. ANN.

art. 852a (Vernon 1964).

190. Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1976).
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of money is dependent on the time of its receipt.'"' A dollar received
today is not necessarily worth a dollar received a year from today
since the dollar received today is available for reinvestment a year
earlier than the dollar received a year hence. In financial analysis
the value today of a series of future payments is called the "present
value" of the payments. Conversely the value of a current payment
at a future date is called "future value" of the payment.
In order to calculate the future value ("FV") of the current investment at the end of an investment period, the current oi present
value ("PV") of the interest is multiplied by a quantity equal to one
plus the interest rate ("i") that the investment is earning per investment period. This relationship can be represented by the following
equation:
PVX (1+i) =FV

For multiple periods, the equation becomes:
PVX(I+i)n =FV

when n is the number of periods"' during which interest is compounded.
From this equation it is possible to arrive at an expression for the
present value of a future payment: 9 3
PV

FVX

1

n

= FVX

1
1{i

_

FV
(1-{i)n

191. The discussion in the text following this footnote is by necessity an extremely brief
introduction to the theory of compound interest. For additional commentary, see J. WESTON
& E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 144-68 (3d ed. 1969); W. JEAN, THE ANALYTICAL THEORY
OF FINANCE 8-13 (1970); for a rigorous and extensive analysis, see S. KELLISON, THE THEORY
OF INTEREST 1-27 (1970).
192. When the period is equal to a year, i is the effective rate of interest. For periods
shorter than a year the rate of i% per period is called the nominal rate of interest that is
compounded x times per year. Thus "six percent per year compounded quarterly" means a
rate of 1/ x 6% = 1.5% compounded four times per year. The six percent rate is called the
nominal interest rate. This can be contrasted to the equivalent effective rate of interest which
is (1.015)' - i = 6.136% per annum. See J. KEMENY, A. SCHLEIFER, JR., J. SNELL & G.
THOMPSON, FINITE MATHEMATICS WITH BUSINESS APPLICATIONS

193. See J.

330-31 (1962).
183-84 (1969).

MAO, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL DECISIONS
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The present value of a series of future payments is simply the sum
For
of the present values of the individual future payments.,

simplicity, the quantity

1

(1+

1)

is sometimes referred to as the

discount rate ("d").11
These concepts form the fundamental theory underlying the actuarial method, which this author contends is the most effective
means of realizing the economic reality of any loan transaction. The
"actuarial method" and a variation of it sometimes referred to as
the "United States Rule""' are procedures in which any series of
payments and advances on a loan may be broken down into a principal component and an interest component. The United States Supreme Court in Story v. Livingston"' stated the United States Rule
as follows:
The correct rule in general is, that the creditor shall calculate interest
whenever a payment is made. To this interest the payment is first to
be applied; and if it exceed the interest due, the balance is to be
applied to diminish the principal. If the payment fall short of the
interest, the balance of interest is not to be added to the principal so
as to produce interest."'
A definition' 9' of the actuarial method is found in the federal truthin-lending regulations2' in which it is defined as:
[The] method under which payments made on a debt are allocated
between the amount of the finance charge and the amount financed,
194. Id. at 184.
195. See S. KELLISON, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 10 (1970). For a brief discussion of the
discount rate, see note 17 supra.
196. Regulation Z used in Federal Truth-in-Lending also refers to the "United States
Rule." See 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(b)(2) (1978). Additionally, as explained below, the "actuarial
method" employed in Federal Truth-in-Lending is in actuality a variation from the strict
actuarial method. See note 199 infra. Unless otherwise changed by context, the term
"actuarial method" shall mean the procedure set forth in the text accompanying notes 219227 infra.
197. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 359 (1839).
198. Id. at 371. The United States Rule and its application in other jurisdictions was
discussed in Community Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fisher, 409 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex. 1966). The
United States Rule does not allow accrued but unpaid interest to be compounded.
199. Under Regulation Z the term "accumulated finance charge" is substituted for
"interest" and the term "amount financed" is substituted for principal. The only difference
between the actuarial approach applied in truth-in-lending and the true "actuarial method"
is the use of the concept of a "unit period" in truth-in-lending, which deviates from a pure
actuarial method but which is necessary in order to make the actuarial method functional
for a disclosure purpose.
200. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1978).
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so that each payment is applied first to the accumulated finance
charge and any remainder is subtracted from, or any deficinecy is
added to, the unpaid balance of the amount financed. 01
The widespread applicability of the federal truth-in-lending disclosure requirements 20 2 as well as the actuarial method's obvious
compatibility with existing federal credit disclosure requirements,
highlights the desirability of the use of this method of calculation
for determination of usury. Additionally, most lending institutions
would be able to ascertain quickly whether a loan is usurious based
upon existing federal truth-in-lending tables. 20 3 The operative language of the version of the actuarial method employed in supplement I to regulation Z is as follows:
Section 226.5-Supplement-Generalrule and equations for determining the annual percentage rate pursuant to paragraph (b) of
§ 226.5
(a) General rule-other credit. The annual percentage rate shall
be that nominal annual percentage rate determined by multiplying
the unit-period rate by the number of unit-periods in a year and shall
be computed so that it may be disclosed with an accuracy at least to
the nearest quarter of 1 percent. The unit-period rate shall be determined as that percentage rate which will yield a sum equal to the
amount of the finance charge when it is applied in accordance with
the actuarial method under which payments made on a debt are
allocated between the amount of the finance charge and the amount
financed, so that each payment is applied first to the accumulated
finance charge and any remainder is subtracted from, or any deficiency is added to, the unpaid balance of the amount financed.
(b) Unit-period. For the purposes of determining the unit-period,
all calendar months may be considered as equal periods and the
following shall be applicable:
(1) The term of the transaction commences on the date of its
consummation, except that if the finance charge begins to accrue on
any other date, the term of the transaction shall be considered as
beginning on the date the finance charge begins to accrue and ending
on the date the last payment is due.
(2) Periods are the intervals of time between advances or between
payments and include the interval of time between the date the fi201. 34 Fed. Reg. 2017 (1969) [incorporated by reference in 12 C.F.R. § 226.5 (1978)].
202. See Landers, The Scope of Coverage of the Truth in Lending Act, 1976 A.B.F. RES.
J. 565, 565-66.
203. See 1 & 2 BOARD OF GovERNORs OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, TRUTH IN LENDING
REGULATION Z ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE TABLES.
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nance charge begins to accrue and the date of the first advance thereafter or the date of the first payment thereafter, as applicable.
(3) A common period shall be any period which occurs more than
once in a transaction.
(4) The unit-period shall be that common period, not to exceed
one year, which occurs most frequently in the transaction; except
that
(i) If two or more common periods occur with equal frequency, the smaller of such common periods shall be the unitperiod; or
(ii) If there is no common period in the transaction, the unitperiod shall be that period which is the average of all periods
rounded to the nearest whole standard intervals of time, the
lower shall be the unit-period. For the purpose of this subparagraph, a standard interval of time shall be a day, week, biweek,
semimonth, month, or a multiple of a month up to, but not to
exceed 1 year.
(5) The unit-period in a single advance single payment transaction shall be the term of the transaction, but not to exceed one year.5 4
The above method for arriving at a nominal annual percentage
rate0 5 encompasses several concepts: unit period, unit period rate,
204. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5 (1978).

205. The use of a nominal rate of interest instead of an effective rate of interest is quite
common. For example amortized loan schedules are based upon interest rates that are compounded monthly. Similarly federal truth-in-lending has incorporated nominal rates of interest into its disclosure requirements. The main reason for the popularity of this method of
computation is probably the ease of computation as well as the need for simplicity in disclosure of interest rates. The use of nominal rates of interest generally results in a lower stated
rate of interest than the equivalent effective rate of interest. Because of this understatement
of the effective rate of interest, it can be argued that the use of nominal rates allows lenders
to collect interest in excess of the amount that they could collect based upon an effective rate
of interest. It can also be argued that the ten percent per annum ceiling contained in section
11 of article XVI of the Texas Constitution should be read as an effective rate of interest. If
that interpretation is adopted, then existing loans amortized on a monthly basis based on a
nominal interest rate higher than 9.569% would exceed a ten percent effective rate and
therefore be usurious. This 9.569% rate is based on the assumption that no points or other
judicially construed interest charges are paid by the borrower at closing. If any points are paid
by the borrower this nominal rate would be even lower based on the reduced principal
computation of Nevels.
Several reasons for interpreting the constitutional ceiling as a nominal rate of interest
do exist:
(1) Probably the strongest argument in favor of this interpretation is based upon the
long standing practice of the use of nominal rates in interest computations. An analogy
can be drawn between this practice and the practice of the deduction of "interest in
advance" from short term loans. In Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex.
400, 412, 30 S.W.2d 282, 286 (1930) and in Bothwell v. Farmers' & Merchants' State
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and accumulated finance charge." °6 The application of these concepts is demonstrated in the following examples.
Example 16. L lends $100 to D on June 1, 1977, payable on June 1,
1978, together with interest accrued in the amount of $10. This can
be represented graphically on a time line'1 as follows:
Advances

$100

Time

0 months

Payments

12 months
.$110

Upon re-examination of the language of regulation Z, supplement
I, subsection (b), a unit-period of one year will be found. The interest or accumulated finance charge ("AFC") is $10. The first and
Bank & Trust Co.', 120 Tex. 1, 6, 30 S.W.2d 289, 291 (1930), the Texas Supreme Court,

after acknowledging that allowing a lender to deduct interest in advance at the highest
lawful rate for loans of a term of a year or less logically results in usury, held that the
practice was too firmly established in Texas to depart from and, therefore, the court
would continue not to consider the practice to result in usury. Accord, Southern States
Mortgage Co. v. Lykes, 85 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ refd)
(dictum); Webb v. Pahde, 43 S.W. 19, 20 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ); Tucker v.
Coffin, 26 S.W. 323, 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ). It can be demonstrated that
the effective rate of interest for a one year loan with ten percent interest deducted in
advance is actually 11.1%. See Comment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest

and Interest in Advance, 29 Sw. L.J. 748, 751 n.25 (1975). The maximum effective rate
that can be obtained from a ten percent nominal rate per annum is 10.5171% per
annum. See note 222 infra. Because of this maximum it can be argued that use of the
nominal rates does effectively preserve a ceiling on interest rates.
(2) One obvious practical effect of not interpreting the constitutional ceiling to be a
ten percent nominal rate is the result that a great many existing loans (i.e., those based
on a nominal rate of interest greater than 9.569%) would then be usurious. This result
would be particularly inequitable for lenders who had relied on this long standing
practice of computation. For example, a thirty-year self-amortizing $50,000 loan payable in monthly installments of $429.58 per month based on a 9.75% per annum nominal
interest rate requires the borrower to pay total interest of $104,647.79 over the life of
the loan. Since the penalty for usury at the time this article was prepared was forfeiture
of twice the interest contracted for, the lender would forfeit $209,295.58 on such a loan.
(3) Nominal interest rates are used in federal truth-in-lending and are a widely used
system for existing consumer transactions. Additionally the use of the actuarial
method, which uses a nominal rate of interest, has already found legislative acceptance
in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-14.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
(4) Finally, nominal rates of interest provide an easy method of computation whereas
the computation of effective rates of interest for periods shorter than a year require
the use of somewhat involved calculations. See note 222 infra.
206. Accumulated finance charge can be thought of as accrued interest.
207. A "time line" shows a series of transactions over a period of time, normally with
advances indicated above the time line and payments shown below the time line.
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only payment is first applied to the AFC leaving $100, which reduces the outstanding principal to zero. Based on the formulas derived earlier, this would be represented as the following equation:"
100= 110
(1+0
when i is the unit-period rate ("UPR"). The application of simple
algebra yields a value of i equal to 0.1 or ten percent. The number
of unit-periods in this example is one so that the nominal annual
percentage rate ("NAPR") equals one times the UPR, which is ten
percent per annum.
Example 17. L again lends D $100 but this time D must pay back $55
after six months and then another $55 at the end of the second six
months.
This can be represented on a time line as follows:
Advances
Time

$100
$55.00

$55.00

Payments
Unit Period:

12 months

6 months

0

6 months

This transaction can be represented by the following formula:
100

=

(1+)

+

55

(1+i)2

Solution of the equation reveals i = .06597, or 6.597%, which is the
UPR. The number of unit-periods is two so that the NAPR equals
2 x 6.597% = 13.194%. In Example 16, D had the use of the entire
loan proceeds ($100) over the full loan term, whereas in this example, D was required to repay a substantial portion of the loan ($55)
after the expiration of one-half of the loan term. Therefore, D had
the use of less money during the latter half of the loan term although
his cost for the use of the money over the loan term ($10) was the
same in both examples. The higher interest in this example reflects
the fact that D had the use of less than the full amount of the loan
proceeds over the entire term of the loan.
Example 17 can be examined in the context of the definition of
the actuarial method under which each payment is applied first to
208. A detailed discussion and understanding of the general equation is not necessary
for the general reader. A more technical discussion of the general equation along with the
general equation for the true actuarial method can be found at note 216 infra.
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the accumulated finance charge and any remainder is subtracted
from the unpaid balance of the amount financed. First, since the
NAPR is 13.194%, the AFC at the end six months would be $6.60.
55.00
-6.60

First Payment
AFC for 6 months
Reduction of Principal

48.40

Principal
Reduction of Principal

100.00
-48.40
51.60

Remaining Principal

x UPR

x.06597

AFC

3.40

Second Payment
AFC for second 6 months

55.00
-3.40

Reduction of Principal

51.60

Principal

51.60

-51.60

Reduction of Principal

0.00

Remaining Principal

Example 18. L loans $100 to D payable $5 after six months and $110
at the end of the year.
The equation:

1

100

+5

(1+i)
Yields i =
NAPR =

110
1
(1+i)2

.07411
14.822%

If D had paid nothing until the end of the year and then paid $115,
the interest rate would be fifteen percent, a higher interest rate than
if D had made an earlier payment. To understand this phenomenon,
one must simply recall that each payment (or advance) triggers a
conversion of the accrued but unpaid interest into principal, resulting in a compounding of the interest during the next computation
period.2 " This result can be best understood by an examination of
the application of the definition of the actuarial method to Example
18.
AFC at 6 months
Payment
Deficiency of payment over AFC

$7.41
-5.00
$2.41

209. See note 205 supra, and note 222 infra, for a discussion of nominal rates of interest.
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Since the next-to-last clause of subsection (a) of supplement I
states that the "deficiency [is] added to . . . the unpaid balance
of the amount financed," the $2.41 is added to the unpaid principal.
Unpaid Principal
AFC

$102.41
+7.59

Second Payment

$110.00

Example 19. The same loan as Example 18 but with payments of $10
after six months and $105 at the end of the year:
100
Yields i =
NAPR
=

10

(1+i)

105

-

(1+i) 2

.07592
15.184%

In Example 18 the first payment was insufficient to cover the accumulated finance charge. As a result the unpaid principal balance
increased after the application of the first payment. In Example 19
the payment was in excess of the accumulated finance charge,
which resulted in the unpaid principal balance decreasing after the
application of the first payment."" Because the unpaid principal
balance for the remainder of the loan term in this example is less
than that in Example 18, the average principal balance available to
D is less. Since the UPR is roughly equivalent to the ratio between
the accumulated finance charge and the average outstanding principal balance, when the average outstanding principal balance is decreased but the AFC remains fixed, the interest rate increases.
210. Since the NAPR is 15.184%, the AFC at the end of six months would be $6.60.
First Payment

-

$ 10.00

AFC for 6 months

-

7.59

Reduction of Principal

=

2.41

Principal
Reduction of Principal

100.00
2.41

Remaining Principal
x UPR

97.59

AFC
Second Payment
AFC for second 6 months

x.07592

-

7.41

=

105.00
7.41

Reduction of Principal

97.59

Principal

--

97.59

Reduction of Principal

-

97.59

Remaining Principal
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Example 20. L loans D $100 at eleven percent interest during the first
year and nine percent during the second year with interest payable
yearly and with maturity date at the end of the second loan year.
The time line would be as follows:
Advances

$100.00

Years

0

2

1

$109.00

$11.00

Payments

The equation:
100=

11
(10

109

+

(1+j)2

Solution of the equation yields i=NAPR=10.048%. This is the expected result since the lender charged a rate of interest greater than
ten percent during the early portion of the loan.
Example 21. L loan D $100 at nine percent interest during the first
year and eleven percent interest during the second year with interest
payable yearly and with a maturity date at the end of the second loan
year.
Advances

$100.00

Years

0

Payments

1

2

$9.00

$111.00

The equation:
100=

9

9

(1 +0

111

+

(1+j)2

This formula yields i=NAPR=9.953%. As one would expect Example 21 yielded an interest rate lower than ten percent because of the
lower interest paid in the first year.
Example 22. L loans D $100 at eleven percent interest during
the first year, and nine percent interest during the second and third
years, with interest payable yearly and with a maturity date at the
end of the third loan year. The time line would be as follows:
Advances

$1100.00

1I

Years

0

1

Payments

$11.00
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21 1
The equation would be:

11
100= (1+i0

9
(1+i) 2

119
(1+i )3

The equation when solved for i yields i=9.729%, which is equal to
the NAPR. Thus, merely because more than ten percent interest
was collected during the early portion of the loan would not in itself
render an average interest rate greater than ten percent over the life
of the loan under the actuarial method.
The examples thus far discussed have involved payments occurring at the end of each unit-period. But a loan involving irregular
payments and advances would, under the truth-in-lending approach, require the selection of a unit-period."' If there are more
than four irregular payments, the equation for such a loan becomes
difficult or impossible to solve algebraically.2 31 In that instance resort must be made to published tables and estimation work
sheets, 14 or to computers or programmable calculators. As previously stated truth-in-lending is a disclosure statute and is concerned with the calculation of a rate to be disclosed. For purposes
of usury determination, however, it is not necessary to calculate an
actual rate of interest or a unit-period."' All that must be determined is whether the actual rate is greaterthan the specified lawful
211. Each additional unit period increases the degree of the equation. Here the equation
is an equation of degree three corresponding to three time periods.
212. The reason for the neceslity of a unit period is that unless a uniform period is used,
no definite annual nominal percentage rate can be calculated. Nominal interest rates only
have meaning because of the period upon which it is based. Thus a ten percent nominal
interest rate based upon a three month compounding is not equivalent to a ten percent
nominal interest rate based upon a monthly compounding. See note 205 supra, and the table
at note 222 infra.
213. It has been proven that a general equation of degree five or higher is incapable of
solution algebraically. I. HERsTWEI, Topics IN ALIGEBRA 214 (1964). For approximation of the
solutions to these equations resort must be made either to tables or to computer analysis;
however, several hand.held programmable calculators have the capacity to compute the
interest rate to any reasonably desired accuracy. For a simplified method of solving equations
of degree three or four, see S. NEUMARK, SOLUTION OF CUBIc & QuARTIc EQUATIONS (1965).

214. 1 & 2 BOARD

REGULATION

Z

OF

GovERNoRs

OF THE FEDERAL RESERvE SYSTEM, TRUTH IN LENDING

ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE

TABLES.

215. The unit period is used as an approximating device that often does not correspond
to the actual dates of all the payments or advances.
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rate. This greatly simplifies the calculations required"' since solution of the general equation is not necessary. Instead one need only
calculate whether the total amount the borrower is required to pay
to the lender is less than the total amount that the lender could have
charged if the loan had been structured so that each payment was
made with interest at the highest permissible rate. In the event the
amount paid is actually less than the amount that could have been
charged, the loan is not usurious. This concept is illustrated by
Example 23.
Example 23. In State Y the usury rate is thirteen percent and in State
Z the usury rate is fourteen percent. L lends D $100. D must pay back
$55 after six months and then another $55 at the end of the second
six months.
In order to determine whether the loan in this example (which is
identical to the loan in Example 17) is usurious, the actuarial
method is applied by using the maximum lawful rate of interest to
determine whether D pays back more or less than the maximum
amount permitted by law.
216. If one wishes to determine the exact rate of interest of a loan the general equation
of supplement I must be used. The general equation of supplement I is as follows:

U,
(I + i) 8 i-(1
Uk
9k
m
Pi
tj
n
w
i
R
R

+i)g

P

Um

U2
2

(1 +

)Xn

(I + i)t(1

+

P2
+ j)'2

Pn

(1 + W)'

The amount of credit advanced directly or indirectly at the end of
the kth period.
= The number of unit-periods from the date of consummation of the
date the finance charge begins to accrue, as applicable, to the kth
advance.
The number of advances to be made by the creditor.
The amount of the payment to be made at the end of the jth period.
=The number of unit-periods from the date the finance charge begins
to accrue to the jth payment.
The number of payments.
The number of unit-periods in a year.
The percentage rate of finance charge per unit-period.
The nominal annual percentage rate expressed as a decimal number
which shall be converted into a percentage rate by moving the decimal point two places to the right.
=

wi.
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Loan Amount
Maximum Lawful Interest Rate

100.00
13%

100.00
14%

Unit Period
Unit Period Interest Rate (UPR)
First Payment

6 months
.065
55.00

6 months
.070
55.00

Interest ("AFC") for 6 months

-6.50

-7.00

Reduction of Principal

48.50

48.00

Principal
Reduction of Principal

100.00
-48.50

100.00
-48.00

51.50
X.065
3.35

52.00
X .07
3.64

55.00
-3.35

55.00
-3.64

Reduction of Principal

51.65

51.36

Remaining Principal
Reduction of Principal

51.50
-51.65

52.00
-51.36

Remaining Principal
X Interest rate (UPR) for 6 months
Interest second 6 months
Second Payment
Interest (AFC) for second 6 month period

Remaining Principal

-

.15

.64

The negative balance shown under the calculations for state Y implies that D would pay back more than the maximum permitted by
law in State Y (13%) and, therefore, the loan is usurious in State
Y. The calculations for State Z result in a positive balance of remaining principal implying that D would not pay back more than
the maximum permitted by law in State Z (14%) and, therefore, the
loan is not usurious in State Z. These conclusions are consistent
with the earlier calculations in Example 17 in which the actual rate
of interest was determined to be 13.194%.
In other words, use of the actuarial approach does away with the
necessity of misleading concepts such as "prepaid interest" and
"front-end interest." Instead any payment that a court or the parties would characterize as either interest or as principal payment
would be analyzed in terms of the economic reality of the transaction as follows: (i) any excess interest over the maximum legal rate
charged in a particular period would be treated as if it were a payment on the principal of the loan at that time thereby decreasing
the outstanding principal balance; (ii) any excess uncharged interest (the difference between the amount of interest paid and the
amount which could have been charged at the maximum legal rate)
in a particular period would be treated as an increase of the principal of the loan; and (iii) the court should then determine under this
method whether in the last computation period of the loan the inter-
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est charged exceeds the maximum amount permitted in which event
the loan should be held to be usurious.
Example 24. D borrows $50,000 and in return executes a $50,000 tenyear promissory note at six and one-half percent with interest only
payable yearly until maturity, and four promissory notes each in the
amount of $3,125 bearing no interest and maturing at the end of the
first, second, third, and fourth years, respectively. This transaction
can be represented on the time line as follows:
Advances

$50,900

3

2

5

4

I
6

I

7

8

I

I

9

10

3250 3250 3250 3250 3250 3250 3250 3250

3250 3250
3125

I

I

1

0

Years

1I

3125 3125 3125

-

50000

6375 6375 6375 6375 3250 3250 3250 3250 3250 53250

Payments

Under the actuarial method a determination whether the interest

paid exceeded the maximum legal rate (ten percent) is made as
follows:
Accrued
Year Interest
0

Calculation of Reduced
Principal
50,000.00

Payment

-1,375.00

1

5,000.00

-

6,375.00

2

4,862.50

-

6,375.00

=

48,625.00
-1,512.50

3

4,711.25 -

6,375.00

-

47,112.50
-1,663.75

4

4,544.88 -

6,375.00

45,448.75
-1,830.12

5

4,361.86

-

3,250.00

43,618.63
1,111.86

6

4,473.05

-

3,250.00

=

7

4,595.35

-

3,250.00

=

8

4,729.89 -

3,250.00

-

9

4,877.88 -

3,250.00

=

10

5,040.67 -53,250.00

=

=

44,730.49
1,223.05
45,953.54
1,345.35
47,298.89
1,479.89
48,778.78
1,627.88
50,406.66
-48,209.34

Remaining Principal
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The facts given for Example 24 are identical to the facts of
Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp.' The court in Ramp held the transaction to be usurious. If calculated under the actuarial method, the
loan would not be usurious since the amount collected by the lender
was less than could have been collected had the lender charged at
each payment the maximum amount of interest permitted by law. '
A quick comparison of Example 24 to Example 9 will illustrate the
illogic of construing this loan usurious merely because of the labels
attached to the charges by the parties.
The rules for applying the actuarial method in order to determine
whether any loan is usurious or not can be summarized as follows:
Rule 1. Each payment (or advance as the case may be) is considbasis chronologically commencing with the
ered on a step-by-step
219
initial advance.
Rule 2. Interest that has accrued on the initial or remaining principal since the previous calculation (i.e., the last payment or advance) 2 1 is calculated 22'at the maximum lawful interest rate.222
Rule 3. Each payment is first applied to the interest calculated
under Rule 2.
217.
218.
identical
Example

135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940).
The reader may wish to verify for himself that the cash flow in Example 24 is
to the cash flow in Example 9. This is demonstrated by the following time line for
9:

The time line for that transaction would be as follows:
Advances
1,111.86

50,000.00
Year

0

1

2

3

4

1,223.05

5

6

1,345.35
7

1,479.89

1,627.88

8

9

10

Interest
Payment

5,000.00

4,862.50

4,711.25

4,544.88

4,361.86

4,473.05

4,595.35

4,729.89

4,877.88

2,843.34

Principal
Payment

1,375.00

1,512.60

1,663.75

1,880.12

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

50,406.66

Total Payment
(net of
advances)

6,375.00

6,875.00

6,375.00

6,375.00

3,250.00

3,250.00

3,250.00

3,250.00

3,250.00

53,250.00

Example 9 was not usurious. The only way in which the two transactions can be distinguished
is by the form of the transaction - not by any difference in the amount of money actually
paid or received.
219. The commencement date of the loan is the initial advance.
220. See calculations in Example 16 at page 808 supra.
221. In this manner the maximum permissible interest that the lender could collect is
calculated for each step.
222. As discussed previously at note 205 supra, it is anticipated that nominal rates of
interest would be used for periods of less than a year. The set of rules set forth in the text
allow one to compute a nominal ten percent interest rate for each period of the transaction
and allow one to evaluate whether the actual payments exceed that permitted by a nominal
rate of ten percent for each period of the loan. There is, however, nothing to preclude the
calculation of an effective rate of interest for each period of the calculation instead of a
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Rule 4. If the payment exceeds the interest calculated in Rule 2, the
excess is is deducted from the unpaid principal of the loan. m
Rule 5. If the payment is less than the interest calculated in Rule

2, the "deficiency" (i.e., the excess of the interest calculated in Rule
2 over the payment) is added to the unpaid principal.n'
nominal rate. Values of the equivalent effective interest rates for certain nominal interest
rates for periods of various durations are shown below:
Effective Interest Rate
Nominal
Interest
Rate

SemiAnnually

Quarterly

Monthly

Weekly

Daily

Continuously

1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%

1.003
2.010
3.023
4.040
5.063
6.090
7.123
8.160
9.202
10.250

1.004
2.015
3.034
4.060
5.095
6.136
7.186
8.243
9.308
10.381

1.005
2.018
3.042
4.074
5.116
6.168
7.229
8.300
9.381
10.471

1,005
2.020
3.045
4.079
5.124
6.180
7.246
8.322
9.409
10.506

1.005
2.020
3.045
4.081
5.127
6.183
7.250
8.328
9.416
10.516

1.005
2.020
3.046
4.081
5.127
6.184
7.251
8.329
9.417
10.517

The values in the foregoing table were obtained from the relationship:

[1 +

eff

(Inoa)

1

Where
I

=

I

=

n

=

effective rate of interest
nom
eff
nominal rate of interest

number of periods per year (which
is not restricted to integral values of n)

The continuous rate is computed from the equation
eff

n

1

See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 154-56, 161-64 (3d ed. 1969) for a deriva-

tion of these formulae. For a rigorous mathematical treatment of this subject, see R. ALLEN,

MATh EMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR ECONOMISTS 228-37, 401-05 (1950). Because of the additional
required calculations involved in the use of effective rates of interest and because of the

reasons set forth at note 205 supra, it seems prudent to be content with nominal rates of
interest.

223. See calculations in Example 16 at page 808 supra. In this way the front-end
reduction of principal approach of Nevels is embodied in the actuarial method and is, in fact,
extended through application of the concept to all payments rather than merely the initial
front-end payment.
224. See Example 11 at page 789 supra. This conversion of the accrued but unpaid
interest into principal then results in a compounding of interest during the next computation
period.
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Rule 6. At each advance of additional principal, the interest calculated under Rule 2 plus the amount of the advance are added to the
principal remaining from the previous calculation. "
Rule 7. After all of the payments and advances have been treated
according to the foregoing rules, the resulting principal balance is
tested to determine whether the loan is usurious.
(a) If the principal balance is positive, the loan requires the payment
of less interest than the maximum permitted by law so the loan is not
usurious.2"'
(b) If the principal balance is negative, the loan requires the payment of more interest than the maximum permitted by law so the
loan is usurious. 2 1 Examples 17 and 24 illustrate the application of
these Rules.
The foregoing analysis may also be used to determine the maximum front-end charge for an amortized loan under the actuarial
method:
(1) Compute the present value m of all payments based on the given
interest rate (the "Actual Present Value").
(2) Compute the present value of all payments based on the maximum lawful interest rate (the "Minimum Present Value").
(3) Compute the difference between the Actual Present Value and
the Minimum Present Value by the stated loan amount to find the
Maximum Front-End Charge.
(4) Divide the Maximum Front-End Charge by the loan amount to
find the Maximum Front-End Points.
The maximum front-end charges permissible for a self-amortizing
loan under the actuarial method are summarized in Table D below:

225. This conversion of the accrued but unpaid interest into principal results in a compounding of interest during the next computation period.
226. See State Z computation in Example 23 at page 814 supra.
227. See State Y computation in Example 23 at page 814 supra.
228. For a discussion of present value, see text accompanying note 191 supra.
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TABLE D
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE FRONT-END
CHARGES UNDER THE ACTUARIAL METHOD
(Percent of Loan Amount)
Interest
Rate(%)
9.999
9.990
9.750
9.500
9.250
9.000
8.000
7.000
6.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000
.100
.010
.001

Years
1

5

10

20

30

50

100

.005
.053
.132
.264
.396
.528
1.055
1.580
2.104
2.626
3.146
3.665
4.182
4.698
5.162
5.213
5.257

.023
.231
.578
1.154
1.728
2.300
4.568
6.805
9.009
11.182
13.322
15.430
17.505
19.548
21.359
21.543
21.592

.012
.419
1.045
2.083
3.117
4.143
8.190
12.139
15.989
19.739
23.387
26.931
30.372
33.709
36.623
36.913
36.967

.069
.686
1.710
3.408
5.094
6.766
13.324
19.660
25.760
31.612
37.206
42.530
47.578
52.344
56.388
56.782
56.839

.084
.841
2.099
4.184
6.255
8.313
16.387
24.188
31.681
38.829
45.598
51.958
57.882
63.349
67.869
68.301
68.357

.097
.965
2.411
4.814
7.210
9.598
19.048
28.294
37.266
45.878
54.034
61.628
68.563
74.752
79.636
80.089
80.142

.010
1.000
2.499
4.997
7.495
9.993
19.976
29.938
39.852
49.660
59.251
68.423
76.865
84.177
89.492
89.951
90.000

It is the contention of the author that the use of the actuarial
method as the method of calculation of interest under article 1.07(a)
would have the following advantages:
1. Certainty of calculation. In any loan transaction no matter
how irregular the payment intervals, the actuarial method provides
a means of consistently determining whether or not the loan is usurious.
2. Constitutionality of article 1.07(a). The actuarial method
would provide a means of preserving the constitutionality of the
statute by preventing unlimited effective interest rates to be
2
charged to borrowers. "

3. Compatability with existing federal and state laws. The actuarial method has already been adopted as a method of calculation
under federal truth-in-lending and under article 5069-14.05 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes.2 3 This method has also been adopted
by the Uniform Consumer Credit Code2 31 and the Uniform Land
229. See Table D supra.
230. TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-14.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
231. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.301(1).
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Transactions Act, 3 ' neither of which has yet been enacted in Texas.
At least one state has adopted the actuarial method for interest
computations.2 3
4. Scientific and financial basis. The actuarial method is
grounded upon well-established basic principles of actuarial science
lending support to its adoption. It is also consistent with the principles of determining yield that are accepted and used in the lending
and borrowing communities.
5. Ease of calculation of refund upon premature termination of
4
loan. Because of early case law regarding acceleration clauses2
most loan documents commonly contain a "savings clause"' 5 to
protect the lender in the event that the term of the loan is shortened
by reason of prepayment or foreclosure. In the absence of a savings
clause, the shortened term of the loan may cause the loan to be
deemed usurious because of a lender's collection of excessive interest. 236 In the event of premature termination of the loan, calculation

of the amount of refund of "unearned interest" to avoid usury is
extremely simple under the actuarial method. Since each payment
and advance is treated sequentially, the amount of the maximum
accrued interest that can be collected at termination is known as
well as the unpaid principal balance of the loan. Any collection in
excess of this amount would be usurious. For example, the maximum payment that can be collected from the borrower after any
particular payment is the amount of the reduced principal.
6. Consistency with legislative history of article 1.07(a). There
is much in the legislative history of article 1.07(a) that indicates the
purpose of article 1.07(a) was to codify Nevels v. Harris.2 7 In Tanner
Development Co. v. Ferguson'5 the supreme court noted the presence of legislative history and suggested that by enacting article
1.07(a), "the legislature merely codified the existing law as applied
in the Nevels line of cases."23 ' One proponent of the legislation
§ 3-401.
233. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 75-17-1 (Supp. 1978).
234. See Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 280 S.W. 181, 182 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1926), superseded, 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
232. UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT

235. A savings clause is a clause providing that any interest in excess of that permitted

by law shall be deemed a payment of principal. It will not, however, "save" a transaction
that is usurious on its face.
236. Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 280 S.W. 181, 182 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1926), superseded, 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
237. 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
238. 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977).
239. Id. at 786. A discussion of the legislative history of article 1.07(a) can be found at
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stated in Senate Committee: "[W]hat we are doing by the interest
amortization in the first provision is just codifying what the existing
law is.' 2'

'°

Further, the Bill Analysis attached in the House stated

that article 1.07(a) "would limit interest rates to a maximum of
10%.'"4 Additionally, in his veto of an earlier bill"' similar to article
1.07(a), Governor Briscoe stated that "it codifies in part the rule in
Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937) and the
ensuing decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Imperial Corp. v. Frenchmen's Creek Corp., et al, 453
''
Fed. 2d 1338 (1972). 43

VII.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, article 5069-1.07(a) presents an opportunity to
eliminate some of the uncertainties that now cloud the law of usury
regarding the computation of interest. Such a goal can only be
achieved if the courts interpret article 1.07(a) as merely providing
a means of computation. The most scientific and consistent method
of computation that could be applied to the statute is the actuarial
method. Judicial adoption of the actuarial method would provide a
simple procedure to verify whether or not a loan is usurious, regardless of the labels placed on payments and advances by the parties.
The recognition by Texas courts of the substance over form doctrine should be embodied in the interpretation and application of
article 1.07(a). Not only does the actuarial method provide a consistent and effective means of applying the substance over form doctrine, thus recognizing the economic reality of a loan transaction,
but it also resolves the ambiguities in article 1.07(a) and the question of the constitutionality of the statute.
Although the algebraic process may at first seem overwhelming
and inhibitive, a closer evaluation reveals that one simple procedure
based on the principles of the actuarial method can be followed in
every transaction. The certainty and simplicity of application for
Comment, Usury Implicationsof Front-EndInterestand Interest in Advance, 29 Sw. L.J. 748,
749, 763-64 (1975).
240. Minutes of the Economic Development Committee of the Senate, 64th Leg., at 7
(March 10, 1975). The quote was cited by the supreme court in Tanner Development Co. v.
Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777, 786 n.13 (Tex. 1977).
241. "What the Bill Purposes to Do," H. B. 351, 64th Leg. (Second Official House
Printing, Feb. 19, 1975).
242. S. B. 209, 63d Leg. (1973).
243. Proclamation of the Governor of the State of Texas, June 16, 1973.
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purposes of usury determination that the actuarial method would
provide should be seriously weighed by any court called upon to
interpret article 1.07(a).
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